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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHERREL DRAPER and NELL FAIRBANKS 
DRAPER, his wife, J. B. DUNN and JULIET 
CRISMAN DUNN, his wife, JACK C. DUNN 
and GLADYS WILEY DUNN, his wife, GLEN 
DRAPER and LORN A F. DRAPER, his wife, 
R. L. REINSIMAR and MARGARET DRA-
PER REINSIMAR, his wife, ERNEST J. 
PEDLER and VIRGINIA A. PEDLER, his 
wife, HENRY L. BUTLER and VIVIENNE 
DRAPER BUTLER, his wife, and CHARLES 
P. RUDD and GLADYS M. RUDD, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees 
-vs.-
J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7685 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The entrance to Big Cottonwood Canyon in the Was-
atch Mountains is approximately eighteen miles south of 
the city limits of Salt Lake City. As a result of pre-
historic geological processes and the action of ancient 
Lake Bonneville, there was deposited at the entrance 
of the Canyon, an enormous amount of sand, gravel and 
other sedimentary soils. This deposit has been cut trans-
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versly by Big Cottonwood Creek, and thereby a defile 
through the deposit was formed. This action concerns 
that part of the deposit which is situate north of the 
defile, and will be hereinafter referred to as "Walker 
Deposit" (Ex. 1, R. 90; R. 821). 
Big Cottonwood Creek as it debouchs from the can-
yon gorge in the immediate vicinity of the Walker De-
posit runs in a northerly and westerly direction (Ex. 1, 
R. 90). 
The defendant is now and was at all times herein-
after mentioned a corporation organized and existing 
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah (R. 
62, 821). One, Mary Goff Walker, is the fee simple owner 
of the Walker deposit and adjacent land (Ex. NNN, R. 
951). Under an arrangement with Mary Goff Walker, 
which is only indirectly involved in this action (R. 951), 
the defendant was in possession of said deposit and land 
in the year 1946 and sine~ that time has been continu-
ously in possession of the same (R. 822). The Walker 
deposit is an immensely valuable source of sand and 
gravel for the manufacture of concrete and for the pro-
duction of aggregate for use in the construction of roads 
and highways (R. 830, 831, 952). The material is con-
sidered the best and most effective produced in the 
western section of the United States (R. 950). The sand, 
gravel and road aggregate yielded by the Walker deposit 
enters into the economy of Salt Lake City and surround-
ing areas as necessary material in the construction in-
dustry (R. 952). It is of a highly desirable quality, and 
since the installation of its processing plant hereinafter 
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particularly described, defendant has been one of the 
major producers of sand and gravel products of the 
Salt Lake City area (R. 952). 
The defendant is not the only operator and pro-
ducer of sand and gravel products from the major de-
posits at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon. There 
were on the date of the commencement of this action and 
for a considerable period of time prior thereto, nine other 
operations in this area (Ex. 25, R. 941 ; Ex. B, R. 323, 
324). The following is a tabulation of these neighboring 
operations. 
Distance from 
Name of Walker 
Operation Established Operations 
R 943 Huber and Davis 1930 2,000 ft.-air line 
R 944 Elmo England 1950 2,500 ft.-air line 
R 945 Salt Lake County 1946-47 3,000 ft.-air line 
R 945-6 Cook and Osborne 1946 3,000 ft.-air line 
R 946 Sims 1920 3,500 to 4,000 ft. 
-air line 
R 947 Harper 1920 4,000 to 5,000 ft. 
-air line 
R 948 Utah Sand & Gravel Co. 1950 6,000 ft.-air line . 
R 948 Barton 1949 Butlerville Hill 
R 947 Abandoned 4,000 ft.-air line 
In the month of June, 1946, defendant commenced 
the ·construction· of its sand and gravel processing plant 
upon the Walker deposit and on the adjacent land (R. 97, 
822). At time of trial it represented an investment of 
$308,659.00 (R. 954). The plant is modern in every re-
spect and was designed by a competent engineer (R. 895, 
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1263-1265). Installed therein are efficient mechanical 
devices which were new at the time they were acquired 
by the defendant (R. 1265). The method of handling and 
processing the raw material after it has been excavated 
from the mountainside involves the use of an extensive 
conveyor system which reduces dust (R. 1268). The type, 
construction and lay-out of the plant are well shown on 
Exhibit A., R. 96; Exhibit B, R. 98; and Exhibits 26, 27 
and 28, R. 960. The machinery composing the plant are 
feeders (Exhibit 15, R. 870), jaw crushers (Exhibit 16, 
R. 871), vibrating screens (Exhibit 17, R. 872), roller 
crushers (Exhibit 18, R. 874) and the conveyors. 
Wasatch Boulevard is a public highway extending 
along the base of the Wasatch Mountains in a general 
north and south direction. At the point where the de-
fendant's plant is located the sand and gravel deposit 
is situate east of Wasatch Boulevard (Exhibit 1, R. 90). 
Wasatch Boulevard, in the immediate proximity of the 
defendant's plant, had been covered with an oil mat, but 
due to its deterioration was scarified in the year 1946 
(R. 925): Work commenced to rebuild the boulevard in 
February, 1949 (R. 926). By August 1, 1950, the boule-
vard had been reconstructed and had been finished with 
a black top to a point immediately east of the Walker 
plant. There is evidence that prior to the black topping 
of this road that it produced a great amount of dust (R. 
927). 
The production of sand, gravel and road aggregate 
after the raw material has been excavated from the 
Walker deposit, requires the transportation of the mate-
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rial to the rollers and crushers. Thereafter when the 
material is reduced to the required sizes through the 
process of crushing, segregation is effected by passing 
the material through screens of different meshes (Ex. 
17, R. 872). Reference to Exhibits A, B, 26, 27, and 28, 
supra, will indicate to the reader exactly the location and 
function of the machinery and appliances above men-
tioned. At the time involved in this action the raw mate-
rial was immediately removed from the Walker deposit 
by means of a drag line and was placed on a conveyor 
belt which carried it to an elevated point east of Wasatch 
Boulevard and at the edge of the vehicular surface there-
of (R. 828, 852). At that point it was dropped perpen-
dicularly through a cylinder or "elephant trunk" to a 
"grizzly" or screen located on the east side of the hard 
surfaced area of the boulevard (R. 828, 829}. It passed 
through a "grizzly" and dropped onto a moving belt which 
is located in a tunnel constructed transversly under Was-
atch Boulevard. This tunnel containing the conveyor 
belt was constructed by permission of the Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County (R. 822). 
Material dropping on to this subterranean belt was car-
ried through the tunnel under Wasatch Boulevard into 
the jaw crusher (R. 829), where it was crushed and 
ground to reduced sizes (R. 877). Thereafter by passage 
through a series of roller crushers and screens, the mate-
rial is sorted and automatically finds it way on to con-
veyor belts. These conveyor belts operate within steel 
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channels or tracks and serve to convey the rna terial to 
the exterior limits of the conveyors where it is dropped 
to the stock piles above mentioned (Ex. 1, R. 849, 850). 
It will be noticed by reference to the exhibits above 
mentioned, that the Walker deposit itself, Wasatch Boule-
vard and the jaw crusher are located at an elevation fixed 
by various witnesses at approximately 75 feet (R. 849), 
above the level of the pit floor (R. 850). 
There are two types of crushers in use at this plant. 
The first is the jaw crusher which stands on the west 
side of Wasatch Boulevard and is a prominent object in 
the aforesaid exhibits (R. 871). The second type is known 
as the roller crusher ( R. 87 4). This roller crusher weighs 
about 15,000 pounds (R. 888) and is composed of two 
rollers ( R. 881). One of them is of smooth surface and 
its twin is heavily corrugated. The corrugations are 
pyramidal in shape (R. 879). Material is run between 
the corrugated and smooth surface roller which rapidly 
revolve each in opposite direction and the material is 
thereby crushed (R. 881). The corrugations on the rough 
surface roller become flattened or worn from the friction 
of material against it in the process of crushing (R. 881). 
It is therefore necessary to "build up" these corrugations 
and this is effected by welding metallic substances there-
to (R. 881-883). During this welding process the plant 
must necessarily cease operations and as a consequence 
welding has been done principally at night (R. 887). It 
is an electric process whereby the added metallic sub-
stance is reduced to a molten state by a current of elec-
tricity passing through it which melts it and affixes it 
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to the roller ( R. 882-884). This welding process neces-
sarily produces flashes of light when the electrified 
metallic substance n1akes contact with the roller to which 
it is to be welded (R. 886). The flash is but momentary 
(R. 886). In adding the molten material to the roller 
there are formed "beads" on the roller (R. 890). The 
"slag" on the face of these "beads" must be knocked off 
before other molten. material is added (R. 890). The 
"slag" is an oxidization of certain of the material in-
cluded in the molten welding rod which form, like "dross" 
on a lead pot when lead is being melted. Before contact 
can be established with the newly welded material this 
"dross" or "slag" must be knocked off with a small ham-
mer (Exhibit 14, R. 891). The noise produced by this 
pounding is limited (R. 892), and merely involves the 
knocking off of the "slag" (R. 892). The smooth roller 
as a result of the friction created by its action on the 
raw material becomes worn and uneven and must also 
be built up by a similar process (R. 882). 
The defendant in its welding operations used two 
types of welders.. One is a gasoline welder which is 
powered through a gas engine. It is a portable machine 
which can be used about the plant (R. 888). The second 
type of welder is an electric welder which is merely a set 
of rectifiers to change the power from AC to DC, with a 
fan to circulate air through it. The noise produced by 
this welder is similar to that of an electric fan (R. 887). 
The finished product consisting of sand, gravel and 
road base material is stocked in separate piles, conical 
in shape, as shown on the exhibits to which reference is 
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above made. It is from these stock piles that the com-
pleted product is taken for transportation and sale. The 
transportation is by means of motor trucks which are 
driven to the immediate vicinity of the stock piles and 
there loaded. The road base rna terial is loaded by means 
of a drag line (Ex. 22, R. 906). On Exhibit 1 (R. 905) 
is shown an underground tunnel approximately 460 feet 
long marked "S-T". The stock piles of concrete aggregate 
are accumulated on top of this tunnel. Within the tunnel 
is a conveyor belt and the concrete aggregate is intro-
duced from the stock piles into the tunnel and onto the 
conveyor belt where it is transported to the northeasterly 
end of the tunnel. At that point the material drops onto 
a loading belt which conveys it into the trucks (R. 904, 
905, 906). 
In October 1948, excavation for the Deer Creek Aque-
duct of the Metropolitan Water District commenced in the 
area of defendant's plant (R. 919, 921). The nature of 
this excavation is graphically shown in the following 
photographs: Exhibit 2 (R. 911), Exhibit 3 (R. 911), 
Exhibit 4 (R. 912), Exhibit 5 (R. 914), Exhibit 6 (R. 914) 
and Exhibit 7 (R. 918). The conduit excavation or trench 
in which the concrete aqueduct was placed varied from 
fifteen to thirty feet in depth (R. 919). The bottom of the 
trench was approximately twelve by fourteen feet in 
width and the top was about fifty feet wide (R. 920). 
The material removed from the trench was piled along 
its sides and this spilled material attained a consider-
able height and breadth (R. 920). The excavation of the 
part of the trench extending from Wasatch Boulevard 
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southwesterly through defendant's pit floor and up to the 
Butlerville Hill commenced on June 27th, 1949. Prior to 
that tin1e, the work was conducted northeast of Wasatch 
Boulevard and southeast of Butlerville Hill road. From 
June 27, 1949 until the latter part of November, 1949, the 
work of excavating the trench and constructing the aque-
duct continued through the land in possession of defend-
ant (R. 921). Heavy machinery and equipment were used 
in effecting this excavation (R. 921, 922), and as a con-
sequence a tremendous amount of dust was created. 
There was a cloud of dust over the area during the entire 
time that the equipment was in operation (R. 922). In 
excavating this aqueduct trench, it was necessary to build 
two "shoofly" roads. One of them extended from the 
top of Butlerville Hill down its slope to permit construc-
tion equipment to reach the aqueduct right of way (R. 
923; Exhibit 24; R. 924 ; R. 925), and the other was a by-
pass on the county road on Butlerville Hill. During the 
time of this construction, the natural vegetation along the 
line of the aqueduct trench and the temporary roads was 
destroyed and the removal of such vegetation allowed 
sudden gusts of wind to pick up dust from the devastated 
areas and carry it into the air (R. 923, Exhibit 24; R. 
929). 
Big Cottonwood Highway, a public road which has 
existed for a number of years, runs adjacent to the pit 
floor. It had been previously an improved highway, but 
in 1946, it had so deteriorated that the top had been scari-
fied and in fact became a gravel highway. It remained 
in that condition until approximately September 1st, 
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1947. During the construction of Deer Creek Aqueduct, 
it was again torn up where it passed adjacent to defend-
ant's pit floor. From June 27th, 1949, to the time that 
the work on the aqueduct on Butlerville Hill was com-
pleted, this road was in a dilapidated condition and re-
mained so until November of 1949 (R. 932). It produced 
a great amount of dust (R. 934). 
The plaintiffs were at the time of the commence-
ment of this action, and for several years prior thereto, 
the owners of residences situate adjacent to the land of 
which defendant was in possession. The location of these 
homesites with reference to defendant's operations is 
shown upon Exhibit NNN (R. 566), which is a plat of 
this area reproduced from the Salt Lake County deed 
records. The plaintiffs acquired these properties at the 
approximate times shown on the following schedule: 
Date of 
Acquisition 
Name of Plaintiff of Property 
Pherrel Draper and Nell Fairbanks Draper (R. 91) 1936 or 1937 
J. B. Dunn and Juliet Crisman Dunn, (R. 412) 1933 
Jack C. Dunn and Gladys Wiley Dunn Dec., 1947 
Glen Draper and Lorna F. Draper, 
R. L. Reinsimar and Margaret Draper Reinsimar, May, 1937 
(R. 327 and R. 431) 
Ernest J. Pedler and Virinia A. Pedler July, 1944 
(R. 448, R. 562) 
Henry L. Butler and Vivienne Draper Butler 1937 
(R. 5'67) 
Charels P. Rudd and Gladys M. Rudd (R~ 567) 1924 
10 
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The plaintiffs Butler, sold and conveyed their resi-
dential property in August, 1950, (R. 523), which was 
after the date of the commencement of this action, to-wit: 
October 18, 1949, (R. 6). 
The aerial photographs introduced in evidence, Ex-
hibit A (R. 96), Exhibit B (R. 98), Exhibits ZZZ and 
Exhibits YYY (R. 1569), will reveal an area south and 
west of defendant's plant which is tree planted. This is 
the area within which the plaintiffs' residences are situ-
ate. These aerial photographs may be sychronized with 
Exhibit 1 (R. 90 and R. 665-673), which is a map upon 
which is delineated and marked these respective homes. 
The plaintiff Draper owns three houses marked respect-
ively, PD1, PD2 and PD3, on Exhibit 1 (R. 95 and 96). 
The houses of the other plaintiffs are appropriately 
marked on Exhibit 1 so that same may be identified. 
This action was commenced and prosecuted by the 
plaintiffs against the defendant for the purpose of secur-
ing an injunction restraining defendant "from maintain-
ing or using said gravel pit or processing plant" on the 
ground that the operation of the same constituted a nui-
sance by reason of the fact that defendant in the removal 
of the sand and gravel and the processing of the same 
as hereinbefore described "causes considerable dust to 
rise and settle upon the lands and homes of plaintiffs, 
and by the movement of such rocks and dirt and the stock-
piling of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads, lanes, 
and creek located upon the lands of plaintiffs, and in 
the vicinity thereof, have become obstructed" (R. 2). 
Furth~r the plaintiffs alleged "that the operation of 
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said gravel pit and processing plant as aforesaid, in the 
manner operated by the defendant, is injurious to the 
health of plaintiffs, and offensive to their senses and 
an obstruction to the free use of and access to their prop-
erty, so as to interfere with their comfortable enjoyment 
of life, and their property, contrary to the laws and 
statutes of the State of Utah~ * ~ ." 
The plaintiffs particularize and describe of the 
alleged nuisance by alleging: 
(a) That dust is deposited on the natural vegeta-
tion on plaintiffs' land, which is detrimental thereto, and 
the natural beauty of said homes and lands is thereby 
destroyed. 
(b) That dust from the plant infiltrates into the 
homes of the plaintiffs and is deposited upon the furni-
ture and household effects and food. 
(c) The operation of defendant's plant results 
in loud noises which disturb plaintiffs in their sleep and 
normal affairs of life. 
(d) That the operation of the welding machines 
produces light and noise prohibiting rest and sleep (R. 
4). 
Of particular concern in this action are certain alle-
gations contained in the complaint with respect to the al-
leged obstruction of roads and lanes. The following per-
tinent excerpts are therefore set out: 
"That in the operation of said gravel plant 
aforesaid, defendant causes huge rocks and boul-
ders to be rolled down the -mountainside, and 
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moves great quantities of dirt • • • and by the 
movement of such rocks and dirt, and the stock-
piling of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads, 
lanes, and creek located upon the lands of plain-
tiffs, and in the vicinity thereof, have become ob-
structed." 
(Par. 6 Complaint, R. 2). 
"That in the operation of said gravel plant 
aforesaid, defendant has caused rocks, boulders, 
and dirt to be rolled down the mountainside and 
has changed the terrain from its original state, 
and has dug away the roads and placed huge 
stockpiles of sand and gravel, so that defendant 
has blocked and made parts of plaintiffs' property 
inaccessible, by obstructing right-of-ways, paths, 
and other means of ingress and egress to the prop-
erty of plaintiffs, thereby damaging the same, 
and rendering said properties of no value as 
homes, or for any purpose." 
(Par. 7, Complaint, R. 3). 
"That the operation of said gravel pit and 
processing plant, as aforesaid, in the manner oper-
ated by defendant is * * *, an obstruction to the 
free use of and access to their property." 
(Par. 8, Complaint, R. 3). 
During the trial the plaintiffs were permitted to 
serve and file an amendment to their complaint (R. 35), 
which alleged: . 
"c. Without limiting the generality of the 
nuisance here complained of, as defined by 104-
56~1 U.C.A. 1943, plaintiffs alleged: 
"That the various operations, as described, 
and the piling and the piles of sand and gravel 
constitute an attraction and attractive nuisance, 
and the loading and caving in are a serious danger 
13 
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to children who are attracted thereto, which in-
terferes with the safe and comfortable enjoyment 
of plaintiffs' properties, and lessens the personal 
enjoyment thereof by plaintiffs, or others, resid-
ing therein. 
"That the conditions caused, and as in this 
paragraph 8 referred to, are offensive to the 
senses and injurious to the health of the occupants 
of the properties of plaintiffs, as herein involved 
and described." 
Defendant answers the complaint and the foregoing 
amendment by denial (R. 20, 21, 49) and pleaded the de-
fense of acquiesence by the plaintiffs in the construction 
and erection of defendant's sand and gravel plant and 
alleged that plaintiffs by their conduct were estopped 
from asserting and claiming the operation of said plant 
is a nuisance (R. 50). Plaintiffs, by their reply denied 
the affirmative defense of defendant (R. 51). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court made, en-
tered and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. For the convenience of the Appellate Court, the 
appellant inserts herein the pertinent and material parts 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
Judgment. 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiffs are all residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and that defendant is a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the State of Utah, 
and duly qualified to do business in said State. 
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2. That defendant, a Utah corporation, owns, and, 
in the course of its business, engages in the operation 
of what is commonly known and described as a gravel 
pit and sand and gravel processing plant. That said 
gravel pit and business, conducted thereat, is located at 
the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, in the vicinity of the common section cor-
ner to Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East. 
3. That defendant, by use of heavy machinery and 
equipment, removes rocks, sand, dirt, and gravel from 
the mountainside North and West of premises owned 
and occupied by plaintiffs, and processes the same 
through the use of crushers, graders, conveyor belts, 
screens, and other heavy machinery, into sand, gravel, 
and similar products for commerical use. That said sand 
and gravel is conveyed, crushed, sorted, and stocked into 
huge piles on the premises, until sold or removed by de-
fendant, in the due course of its business. 
4. That, in its removal, processing, and storage of 
sand and gravel, there is emitted into the atmosphere 
large quantities of dust, dirt, and sediment which are 
carried intermittently by the prevailing natural air cur-
rents from the plant and premises occupied by the de-
fendant corporation, aforesaid, and deposited upon the 
land, homes, and effects of plaintiffs. 
5. That, in the processing of sand and gravel, as 
aforesaid, large crushers, screens, motors, shovels, weld-
ing machines, trucks, conveyor belts, cate.rpillars, and 
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other heavy and noisome equipment is used, both in the 
daytime and night-time, and that said equipment, so used, 
results in loud and disturbing sounds, noises, and vibra-
tions. 
6. That plaintiffs have owned and occupied homes 
located in the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon for many 
years, and that said homes were built and occupied in an 
area remote from commercial or other industrial enter-
prises, except as shown by the exhibits and evidence, on 
account of the clear air and attractive scenic view, and 
for the purpose of quiet enjoyment. That the sites for 
said homes were chosen for the natural beauty, shade, 
and foliage existing thereat. That said homes, owned 
and occupied by plaintiffs, were established many years 
prior to the acts complained of, and prior to the con-
struction of defendant's sand and gravel operation, but 
are presently in close proximity to the gravel pit and 
processing plant, on the South and East thereof. That the 
operation of said gravel pit and· processing plant, as 
aforesaid, by defendant is injurious to the health of 
plaintiffs, and offensive to their. senses, and an obstruc-
tion to the free use of their property, so as to interfere 
with their comfortable enjoyment of life and their prop-
erty, contrary to the laws and to the statutes of the State 
of Utah, in the following particulars: 
a. That dust and sand is deposited upon the shrubs, 
flowers, and foliage located on the lands of plaintiffs, 
and is detrimental thereto, and the natural beauty of 
said homes and lands of plaintiffs is thereby destroyed. 
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b. That dust and sand is carried from the plant, 
storage piles, and premises occupied by defendant into 
the homes of plaintiffs, and deposited on furniture, fix-
tures, household effects, and clothing, and is deposited 
upon the food kept and consumed therein, and is deliteri-
ous thereto, and pollutes the air in said homes. 
c. That the operation of the heavy equipment by 
defendant, as aforesaid, results in noise so loud as to 
render it impossible, while such machinery is so operated, 
to hear ordinary conversation, or sleep, or otherwise 
conduct the normal affairs of plaintiffs. That said noise 
is of such volume that it is impossible to summon or 
properly control the small children of plaintiffs, while 
outside their respective houses, and substantially inter-
feres with the play and recreation of such children; and, 
further, that noise so produced by defendant is of such 
volume that cries or pleas of distress of such children are 
inaudible to their parents, or persons charged with their 
custody and control. That such noise, so produced by 
defendant as aforesaid, destroys and renders very diffi-
cult any outdoor activity or recreation by plaintiffs and 
their children, or visitors, in or on their premises while 
said plant is in operation. 
d. As a necessary and continuing part of . said op-
eration, .welding machines are operated at nights and 
on Sundays, from which there. issues an annoying light 
and pounding noise, which makes normal rest or sleep 
difficult in the homes of plaintiffs, during the pit opera-
tions 01:" ~ai~ ~eldiJ1g operations. 
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7. That the property owned and occupied by plain-
tiffs herein and subjected to said nuisance, as aforesaid, 
is located substantially within the limits of the following 
described real property: 
Beginning at a point where the East line of 
Section 26, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, in-
tersects Big Cottonwood Creek, which is approxi-
mately 475 feet South from the Northeast corner 
of said Section; thence Northwesterly along the 
center of said Creek 340 feet, more or less, to the 
West line of the Pherrel Draper property; thence 
South go 21' West 350 Feet, more or less, to Big 
Cottonwood Road; thence Southeasterly along 
said road 375 feet, more or less, to the East line 
of said Section 26; thense North along said Sec-
tion line 180 feet more or less; thence South 71 o 
40' East 250 feet, more or less, to East Line of 
Jack C. Dunn property; thence North 17° East 
204 feet, more or less, to center of Big Cotton-
wood Creek; thence Northwesterly along the cen-
ter line of said Creek 400 feet, more or less, to 
beginning. 
ALSO : Commencing South 27° 39' East 
246.18 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian; thence South 49° 25' East 242.13 feet; 
. thence. South 29° 41' West 219 feet to center of Big 
Cottonwood Creek; thence along Creek North-
westerly about 273 feet, more or less; thence 
North 39° 13' East 268 feet, to beginning. 
ALSO: Commencing at a point which is 
South 57° 39' East 228 feet and South 50° 47' East 
200 feet and South 67° 54' East 200 feet from the 
Northwest corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence South 48° 10' West 290 feet; thence South 
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61° 47' East along center of Big Cottonwood 
Creek 170¥2 feet; thence North 34° 7' East 250 
feet; thence North 47° 57' West 100 feet, to begin-
ning. 
8. That the maintenance and operation of said 
.gravel pit and processing plant is a nuisance, and, if 
continued, will result in substantial and permanent dam-
·age to the lands, homes, personal property, and health 
of plaintiffs, and result further in a substantial depreci-
ation of their said properties, and prevents the use and 
enjoyment thereof, and destroys the rental and market 
value thereof. 
9.· a. That plaintiffs Charles P. Rudd and Gladys 
M. Rudd, his wife:.,- and their predecessors in interest, 
are the owners of the following described real property 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
Conimencing at a point which is South 57o 
39' East 228 feet-and· S.outh.50? 47' East 200 feet 
and South 67° 54; East 200 feet from the North-
west corner. of Section 25, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake ~feridian, and running 
thence South 48° 10' \Vest 290 feet; thence South 
61 o 47' East along-center of Big Cottonwood Creek 
170% feet; thence North 34° 7' East 250 feet; 
thence North 47° 57' West100 feet, to beginning. 
Contain.ing 0.8 acre. · 
- b. That said Rudd, plaintiffs, and their pre-
decessors in interest have built and maintained a 
su1nmer .. home ··arid recreational .facilities upon 
. said pre1nises, ·and used-. the same since .the year 
1924. That the only n1eans of .access: to said prem-
.ises above·. :described was over a road_ or:.right-of-
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way which extended along the Creek bottoms and 
roughly parallel to Cottonwood Creek from Cot-
tonwood Highway across the parking lot of the 
Old Mill Club, and along the North and East side 
of Cottonwood Creek to said Rudd premises, said 
road extending over the property heretofore and 
subsequently used by defendant corporation. That 
prior to the acquisition of the premises described 
in paragraph 9(a) by plaintiffs Rudd, and their 
predecessors in interest, their said premises, to-
gether with the Old Mill Property, and the prem-
ises upon which the plant operations of defend-
ant are located, and over which all of said road 
passed, were owned by the same party, Emerette 
C. Smith. That, thereafter, the said Emerette C. 
Smith conveyed the premises above described 
to the predecessors in title of plaintiffs Rudd, 
retaining the balance of said property generally 
described above, and on which the road, used from 
the cottonwood highway through the parking lot 
of the Old Mill Club to the Rudd property, extend-
ed. That said road, aforesaid, until it was de-
stroyed subsequent to 1946, was the only means 
of ingress and egress to the property of plain-
tiffs Rudd, and there is presently no means of 
access to said property; that plaintiffs Rudd had 
acquired and have a right-of-way and easement of 
necessity over said road described above in this 
paragraph 9 (b), for this purpose. That, in the 
operation of said gravel plant, as aforesaid, de-
fendant has caused rocks, boulders, and dirt to 
be rolled down the mountainside, and has changed 
the . terrain from its original state, and has de-
stroyed said road, so that defendant has blocked 
and made plaintiffs' Rudd property inaccessible, 
by obstructing said road, and said means of in-
gress and egress, thereby damaging the same, 
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and rendering the property described in para-
graph 9(a) of no value as a home, or for any 
purpose. 
c. That plaintiffs Charles P. Rudd and 
Gladys :M. Rudd, his wife, and Ernest J. Pedler 
and Virginia A. Pedler, his wife, and their prede-
cessors in title, have used and maintained the 
road above referred to in paragraph 9 (b) for 
over 20 years, prior to its destruction by defend-
ant, and such use has been open and notorious, 
and under a claim of right. That said road runs 
through woodland or unimproved and unfenced 
property. 
10. That the operation of said gravel pit 
extends throughout the spring, summer, and fall 
of the year, generally, and is subject, generally, 
to weather conditions; so that said plant is not 
operated when the ground is covered with snow, 
or during the presence of excessive rain and 
moisture. That said plant commenced operation 
in June of 1948, and that, during the year 1948, 
its operation was intermittent and sporadic. That 
the operation of the plant during the year 1949 
was more steady than in the previous year, and 
that its operation, during 1950, has been daily, 
when weather conditions permitted. 
11. That substantial deposits of sand and 
gravel exist on both sides of Cottonwood Creek 
at the entrance to Cottonwood Canyon. 
12. That plaintiffs have not been guilty of 
laches, nor have they acquiesced in the construc-
tion and operation of said gravel plant, nor have 
they been estopped from prosecuting this action, 
as alleged by defendant, or at all. 
13. That, unless restrained, defendant in-
tends to and will continue such operation, and 
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perpetuate the foregoing conditions, resulting in 
the annoyance and damage to plaintiffs, as afore-
said. 
14. That pursuant to the pre-trial order 
made herein on or about October 6, 1950, the 
question of damages suffered by plaintiffs as 
the result of the operation of said gravel plant, 
as aforesaid, both past and prospective, are re-
served until the final determination by this court, 
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, on 
the issues presented for trial herein on the ques-
tion as to whether or not defendant has been 
guilty of operating and maintaining an action-
able nuisance. A.nd, in the event the foregoing 
findings are sustained, the respective actions for-
damages, past and prospective, by each plaintiff, 
shall be further prosecuted by said parties, with 
jury if requested, by filing further pleadings and 
proceedings thereupon. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court 
derives _and makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiffs, and each of ,them, are 
entitled to a decree and order of this court 
promptly restraining, by injunction, the defend-
ant, its officers, servants, agents, or assigns, from 
maintaining, using, or operating said gravel pit, 
processing plant, and sand, gravel and aggre-
gate storage piles used in connection therewith, 
so as to create a nuisance, or permitting such use 
or operation, so as to create a nuisance on the 
lands and premises of plaintiffs, as hereinabove 
described in said findings of fact. 
2. That plaintiffs Rudd are entitled to a 
decree of this court requiring defendant to pro-
vide a right-of-way from a public highway to 
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the pren1ises of plaintiffs Rudd, as hereinabove 
described in paragraph 9; said right-of-way to 
be of such size, condition, and extent as to be 
suitable for use by motor vehicles. And, in this 
connection, that an order restraining defendants, 
its officers, servants, agents, and assigns, from 
interfering with or obstructing said right-of-way. 
3. That plaintiffs are entitled to an order 
of this court, which order shall provide that this 
court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for 
the purpose of determining, by further pleadings 
and conducting further hearings, with jury if re-
quested, the issue of damages, past and prospec-
tive ; such issue to be determined upon the final 
determination of the question of whether or not 
an actionable nuisance has been maintained by 
defendant in the manner alleged and contained 
in the foregoing findings of fact. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to their taxable 
costs herein incurred. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
1. That defendant J. B. and R. E. Walker, 
Inc., its officers, servants, agents, and assigns be 
and hereby are forever enjoined and restrained 
from maintaining, using, or operating, or per-
mitting the use or operation of a gravel pit and 
processing plant used in connection therewith for 
the processing of sand and gravel, including the 
storing or stockpiling of sand and gravel thereat 
and the operation of heavy equipment upon said 
premises, in the vicinity of the common section 
corner to Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Merid-
ian, so as to create a nuisance affecting plaintiffs, 
their lands, homes, premises, and use thereof, 
arising from objectionable noise, dust, and flash-
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ing lights as found by the court and in the manner 
and as more particularly set out and described in 
the findings of fact on file herein. That said lands 
and premises of plaintiffs are located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and substantially 
within the limits of the following described real 
property: 
Beginning at a point where the East 
line of Section 26, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East intersects Big Cottonwood 
Creek, which is approximately 475 feet 
South from the Northeast corner of said 
Section; thence Northwesterly along the 
center of said Creek 340 feet, more or less, 
to the West line of the Pherrel Draper 
property; thence South go 21' West 350 
feet, more or less, to Big Cottonwood 
Road; thence Southeasterly along said 
road 375 feet, more or less to the East 
li:n:e of said Section 26 ; thence North along 
said Section line 180 feet, more or less; 
thence South 71° 40' East 250 feet, more 
or less, to East line of Jack C. Dunn prop-
erty; thence North 17° East 204 feet, more 
or less, to center of Big Cottonwood Creek; 
thence Northwesterly along the center line 
of said Creek 400 feet, more or less, to 
beginning. 
ALSO : Commencing South 27° 39' 
East 246.18 feet from the Northwest cor-
ner of Section 25, Township 2 South; Range 
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian; thence South 
49° 25' East 242.13 feet; thence South 29° 
41' West 219 feet to center of Big Cotton-
wood Creek; thence along Creek North-
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westerly about 273 feet, more or less; 
thence North 39° 13' East 268 feet, to 
beginning. 
ALSO: Commencing at a point which 
is South 57° 39' East 228 feet and South 
50° 4 7' East 200 feet and South 67° 54' 
East 200 feet from the Northwest corner 
of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence South 48° 10' West 290 feet; thence 
South 61 o 4 7' East along center of Big 
Cottonwood Creek 170% feet; thence North 
34° 7' East 250 feet; thence North 47° 57' 
West 100 feet, to beginning. 
This decree shall inure to the benefit of plain-
tiffs' successors and assigns. 
2. That Charles P. Rudd and -Gladys M. 
Rudd, his wife, are hereby granted a right-of-way, 
as against this defendant, to the hereinafter de-
scribed premises from a public highway. Said 
right-of-way is to be of such size, condition, and 
extent as to be suitable for use by motor vehicles. 
And defendant, its officers, servants, agents, and 
assigns are hereby enjoined from interfering with 
or obstructing said right-of-way. 
That the property owned by Charles P. Rudd 
and Gladys M. Rudd, his wife, above referred to, 
is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a point which is South 
57° 39' East 228 feet and South 50° 47' 
East 200 feet and South 67° 54' East 200 
feet from the Northwest corner of Section 
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence South 
48° 10' West 290 feet; thence South 61° 
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47' East along center of Big Cottonwood 
Creek 1701f2 feet; thence North 34° 7' East 
250 feet; thence North 47° 57' West 100 
feet, to beginning. Containing 0.8 acre. 
3. That defendant, its officers, servants, 
agents, and assigns are hereby ordered to restore 
or provide a right-of-way, as above described, 
immediately. 
4. That this court shall retain jurisdiction 
of this action for the purpose of determining, by 
further pleadings and conducting further hear-
ings, with jury if demanded, the issue of damages, 
past and prospective; such issue to be determined 
upon the final determination of the question of 
whether or not an actionable nuisance has been 
maintained by defendant, in the manner set out 
in the findings of fact on file herein. 
5. The effective date of this decree shall 
be five days from its signing. 
6. Plaintiffs are hereby granted and award-
ed their taxable costs herein incurred." 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment were signed and filed on March 9, 1951 
(R. 60, 69). Within the time allowed by the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to-wit, on March 17, 1951, the defend-
ant served and filed its motion for a new trial and to 
amend the Judgment (R. 71, 72). On April 5, 1951, the 
Court denied defendant's motions (R. 75). On March 
9, 1951, defendant served and filed its notice of appeal 
(R. 76), and on said date deposited with the Clerk of 
the trial court the sum of $300.00 in cash funds legal 
tender of the United States of America in lieu of the 
undertaking for damages and costs required by Section 
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104-41-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943 (R. 77, 84). The 
Supreme Court on June 5, 1951, entered its order extend-
ing time to file record on appeal in the Supreme Court 
to August 2, 1951 (R. 82, 83). On July 31, 1951, the record 
on appeal was filed in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court (R. 84). 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR WHICH VITALLY AFFECTS DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHTS BY ITS (1) DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE ALL EVIDENCE RELATING 
TO THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY OVER LAND 
OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS IN POSSESSION; 
(2) OVER-RULING OF DEFENDANT'S OBJEC-
TIONS TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE CREATION, EXISTENCE AND OBSTRUC-
TION OF SUCH RIGHT OF WAY; (3) FINDING 
THAT A RIGHT OF WAY BY NECESSITY WAS 
CREATED AND EXISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
LAND OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFFS RUDD, AND 
(4) ADJUDICATING THAT PLAINTIFFS RUDD 
ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OF NECESSITY 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR SAID LAND. 
There has been set forth at pages 12 and 13 hereof 
certain allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint with 
respect to alleged obstruction by defendant of roads and 
lanes, which it is alleg-ed, afford ingress and egress to the 
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property of plaintiffs. These allegations are of par-
ticular importance in the discussion which follows m 
support of Point I of defendant's argument. 
In connection with these allegations, note should 
be made of the fact that defendant, prior to answering 
plaintiffs' complaint moved the Court for an order re-
quiring plaintiffs to make their complaint more definite 
and certain with respect to the exact location of the 
rights of way, paths and other means of ingress and 
egress to the property of plaintiffs which they alleged 
were obstructed and blocked by defendant's action as 
alleged in Paragraph 7 of the complaint and also set 
forth the exact location of the obstructions or impedi-
ments to the use of said rights of way and means of 
ingress and egress (R. 12). By order of Court, dated 
March 10, 1950, defendant's motion was denied (R. 19). 
Simultaneously with the serving and filing of its answer 
(R. 20, 21) defendant pursuant to and under the author-
ity of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
pounded to the plaintiffs certain interrogatories among 
which were the following: 
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact 
location of the rights of way, paths and other 
means of ingress and egress to the property of 
plaintiffs which they allege in Paragraph 7 of 
their said complaint to have been obstructed and 
blocked by defendant's action~" (R. 23). 
"5. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact 
location of the obstructions and impediments to 
the use of said rights of Way and means of ingress 
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and egress which they allege in their said com-
plaint to have been erected or constructed by the 
defendantf' (R. 23). 
All of the plaintiffs, except plaintiffs Rudd, made 
answer to Interrogatories 4 and 5 above set forth in this 
language: 
"4. Answering Interrogatories 4 and 5 these 
plaintiffs state that the right of ways involved 
belong mainly to plaintiffs Rudd, who have here-
tofore answered and Plaintiffs Pedler adopt the 
answers of plaintiffs Rudd." (R. 28). 
The plaintiffs, Rudd, answered the foregoing Inter-
rogatories 4 and 5 as follows: 
"4. Answering the fourth Interrogatory, the 
plaintiff states that the exact location of the said 
right of way cannot be accurately stated because 
the ground over which it passed has been exca-
vated but that the said right of way passed from 
the southerly end of the old mill property in a 
southwesterly direction until it joined with the 
part of the road which still remains and such 
right of way northwesterly from the plaintiff's 
property, and that said right of way at all times 
was easterly and northerly from the Big Cotton-
wood Creek and ran somewhat parallel to the 
same although at varying distances to the east-
ward and northward from the said Creek." (R. 
26). 
"5. Answering the fifth interrogatory, this 
plaintiff states that the stockpiles which covered 
the ground to the north and east of the said Creek 
but below the hill were part of the obstruction 
and the uneven ground left after excavating 
where the road ran, was one of the impediments." 
(R. 26). 
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On September 6, 1951, a pre-trial was conducted by 
the trial judge and resultant thereon on said date he 
made, entered and filed his pre-trial statement and order 
(R. 30, 31). The pertinent part of said pre-trial order 
follows: 
"I. 
It was stipulated; and the Court also deter-
mined: 
( 1) That the Court find and determine whether 
the operations of the defendant constitute or 
result in a nuisance, and if so, 
(a) Whether there should be a complete in-
junction preventing the defendant from 
continuing its operations; and in the 
event the Court finds that the defendant 
should not be enjoined from continuing 
its operations, then, 
(1) What limitations, if any, should be 
imposed upon the defendant to elim-
inate the nuisance or reduce it to a 
minimum and thus permit the de-
fendant to continue its operations; 
(2) The Court to determine what 
changes and adjustments should be 
made in the defendant's operations 
to reduce the nuisance factor and 
permit the defendant to continue its 
operations. 
( 2) The question of damages to be reserved for 
subsequent pleadings and hearings upon 
which damages, past and prospective, will be 
determined in the event there is a nuisance. 
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n. 
It was stipulated between the parties that the 
Court strike from the complaint the following 
language contained in the last line of Paragraph 
2 thereof: 
"and is maintained on land owned by Mary 
Goff Walker" 
and said portion was ordered stricken by the 
Court. 
liT. 
It was stipulated and ordered pursuant there-
to, by the Court, that the defendant have access 
to the plaintiffs' property for purposes of making 
a survey, and that the plaintiff may use the sur-
vey for evidence and may also use the survey for 
reference ten days prior to the trial of this case.'' 
Attention is invited to Exhibit 1 (R. 90, 821) and 
Exhibit NNN (R. 566) for information as to the location 
of the property owned by the Plaintiffs Rudd and Pedler 
respectively. These properties are identified on these 
plats and maps with respect not only as to their exact 
location, but also with respect to their proximity to the 
Walker deposit and adjacent land of which defendant 
is and was in possession. It is also believed that Exhibit 
CCCC (R. 452), which shows the location of the stock 
piles of sand and gravel will be helpful in understanding 
the facts involved in the present discussion. 
It is to be noted that only the plaintiffs, Rudd and 
Pedler, are immediately concerned with the matters here 
involved, which pertain to the alleged obstruction and 
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blocking by the defendant of an alleged existing road 
affording ingress and egress to the properties of these 
plaintiffs to and from the Big Cottonwood Highway. 
The general location of this public highway is shown 
upon the exhibits to which immediate reference has been 
tnade. 
A substantial part of the evidence received by the 
trial court on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendant 
pertained to this matter. For convenience of the appel-
late court, the defendant and appellant believes it desir-
able to here set forth the page references of the record 
on appeal where this evidence will be discovered. Insofar 
as possible, the identity of the witnesses presenting testi-
mony on this issue is set forth: 
Name of Witness 
Pherrel Draper 
R. L. Reinsimar 
J. :e. Dunn 
Henry L. Butler 
Walter R. Hansen 
Jack C. Dunn 
Charles P. Rudd 
Glen Rudd 
Ernest J. Pedler 
Juliet Crisman Dunn 
Evelyn P. Shelton 
Keith Brown 
William G. Shelton 
Plaintiffs' Evidence 
Record Reference 
R. 209, 211, 213, 646, 647, 1620, 1701, 
1702. 
R. 341-343, 354-357, 359. 
R. 372, 388. 
R. 520-523, 527, 530-539. 
R. 542-5'45. 
R. 545, 551-553, 557. 
R. 565, 580, 649, 653-657, 660-662, 
1541-155'4. 
R. 582, 585. 
R. 594-603. 620, 1560-1570. 
R. 1419, 1428. 
R. 1431-1438. 
R. 1518-1535. 
R. 1536-1539. 
John R. Stewart' · · 
J. B. Walker 
Defendant's Evidence 
R. 673-693; 
William Aligier 
Milton Pedler 
Arthur P. Lakin· 
R. 1042-1067, 1074-1084, 1093-1129, 
1142-1147, 1198-1216, 1220-1226, 
1710-1713, 1717-1723. 
R. 962-1019. 
R. 1246-1257, 1262. 
R. 1355-1357. 
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The plaintiffs and defendant entered into a stipula-
tion ( R. 729) covering the chain of title of the tract and 
parcel of land owned by plaintiffs Rudd as delineated 
and set forth on Exhibit NNN. Said stipulation appears 
in the record of trial as Exhibit VVV. For an under-
standing of the facts stated in the stipulation, it is neces-
sary to refer to the abstract of title, which was intro-
duced in evidence (R. 1206) as Exhibit QQQ. Below is 
set forth the pertinent part of said stipulation to which 
has been added in the extreme right hand column the 
reference to the entries in the abstract, Exhibit QQQ. 
''STIPULATION 
1. The plaintiffs, Charles P. Rudd and Gladys M. 
Rudd, obtained their title through the following instru-
ments recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, as follows: 
Date of Deed 
Date Ack. Recording 
Date Re- Data-Bk. 
Grantor Grantee corded and Page 
Utah Light Emerette C. 12-28-26 31-81 
& Traction Smith 1-27-27 
Emerette C. Fannie 
Smith Horsley 
Gladys M. 
Rudd 
Anne F. 
Rudd 
5-28-27 
9-24-24 
4-25-27 
11-26-27 
31-264 
Abstract 
Reference 
Ex.QQQ 
Abst. No.1 
Entry No. 76 
Abst. No.1 
Entry No. 63 
Fannie A. Chas. P. 
Horsley Rudd 
11-15-45 
5-20-47 
5-29-47 
540-313 Abst. No. 1 
Entry No. 74 
Annia Foul- Gladys M. 
ger Rudd Rudd 
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2. That all of the land in the Big Cottonwood Creek 
Bottoms between the Creek and the hill below the W a-
satch Boulevard and between the Old Mill and the Rudd 
Property was conveyed as follows: 
Date of Deed 
Date Ack. Recording Abstract 
Reference 
Ex.QQQ 
Date Re- Date-Bk. 
Grantor Grantee corded and Page 
Utah Light 
& Traction 
Co. 
Emerette C. 12-28-26 31-81 Abst. No.1 
Entry No. 94 Smith 1-27-27 
5-28-27 
Emerette C. Old Mill 5-20-27 
Smith Tavern, Inc. 5-21-27 
5-28-27 
Old Mill Willard 
Tavern, Inc. Smith 
(By Execu-
tion Sale) 
Willard Mary Goff 
Smith Walker 
Old Mill S. N.Jacob-
Tavern, Inc. sen (By Execu-
tion Sale) 
S. N. Jacob- Mary Goff 
sen Walker 
3-24-33 
3-24-33 
3-27-33 
8-5-33 
8-5-33 
8-10-33 
3-22-38 
3-22-38 
3-23-38 
7-15-38 
7-15-38 
7-16-38 
31-82 
Abst. No.1 
Entry No. 97 
108-546 Abst; No.1 
Entry No. 138 
Same as No. 
303 in Abst. 
No.2 
119-211 Abst. No.1 
Entry No. 142 
206-577 Abst. No. 1 
Entry No. 165 
Same as 313 
in Abst. No.2 
212-5'64 Abst. No. 1 
Entry No. 173 
3. That Mary Goff Walker is the wife of the presi-
dent, one of the principal stockholders of the Plaintiff 
Corporation." 
Early in the trial it became obvious that plaintiffs, 
Pedlers and Rudds in order to sustain the charge that 
the defendant through its operations had obstructed 
roads and lanes and was thereby committing a nuisance, 
endeavored to quiet title to an alleged right of way over 
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lands in the occupancy of defendant. The evidence to 
which defendant and appellant has referred on pages .... 
of this brief had the objective of establishing a right of 
way for the benefit of the Rudds' land and the Pedlers' 
land either by (a) proving that a prescriptive right 
had accrued, or (b) that a right of way of necessity had 
been created. In order for the plaintiffs to succeed on 
the nuisance aspect of the alleged obstruction of roads 
and lanes, they undertook first to secure from the Court 
a decree establishing the right of way which they claimed 
had been obstructed by defendant, and thereby created 
a nuisance. The defendant and appellant, when it became 
apparent that the plaintiffs were claiming that defendant 
had obstructed a right of way which had no acknowledged 
or admitted legal existence, and were first endeavoring to 
establish the legal existence of a right of way upon 
which to base the charge of nuisance, entered its objec-
tion to this proceeding and this type and kind of evi-
dence (R. 211). The following colloquy occurred: 
"Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Is that road-
way in existence at the present time, Mr. 
Draper~ 
A. Well, the gravel fill is used there up as far 
as the stock piles. 
Q. By gravel fill do you mean J. B. and R. E. 
Walker, Incorporated Y 
A. Yes, but from there on it is· obstructed. 
Q. And how is it obstructed? 
A. Well, these stock piles obstruct it in the be-
ginning. 
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GENERAL RITER: Now if the Court please, 
I wanted this interrogation to get along that far 
to give me a chance to make my record and ob-
jection. There is no evidence here to show that 
Pedler or any of the plaintiffs had any right to 
use that roadway. 
THE COURT : There is no evidence showing 
there is a right of way. 
GENERAL RITER: No evidence showing 
there is a right-of-way. 
THE COURT: The Court will grant that. 
GENERAL RITER: I move to strike this 
entire evidence at this time because there must be 
evidence to show their right to use it, and the 
records, as they now stand, show there has been 
no right, no title. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to 
tie that up, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The motion will be taken un-
der advisement. The Court will determine whe~ 
ther or not there is any evidence on the subject 
before ruling on it." (R. 211). 
Thereafter defendant and appellant moved the court 
for an order striking all evidence having for its purpose 
the establishment of this right of way and at the same: 
time defendant and appellant objected to the admission 
of any evidence pertaining to the establishment of a 
right of way either by prescription or of necessity 
(R. 651, 652, 653). The ~ourt denied this motion and 
overruled the objection (R. 653). But the court ordered 
that: 
"The record may show the defendant's objec-
tion to all . this whole line of testimony, even 
though the specific objection isn't made to each 
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question and answer. The objection is overruled. 
Go ahead." ( R. 653). 
During the entire course of the trial the defendant 
objected to the admission of evidence of this nature. 
At the conclusion of the trial defendant and appellant 
renewed its motion to strike this entire line of testimony 
and evidence (R. 1738, 1739, 1740, 1744, 1745). By minute 
order of the court dated January 23, 1951, this motion 
was denied (R. 54). In its motion for a new trial and 
to amend judgment, defendant and appellant specifically 
asked the court to strike Paragraph 9 of the Findings 
of Fact, Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law and 
Paragraph 2 of the Judgment (R. 71). Pursuant to Rule 
75 (d) and (p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the de-
fendant and appellant does hereby assign as error the 
inclusion in the judgment of Paragraph 2 thereof award-
ing the plaintiffs Rudds a right of way of necessity over 
and across land of which defendant was in possession 
(R. 59), and does also assign as error the inclusion in 
the Findings of Fact of Paragraph 9 thereof wherein 
the court found in favor of the plaintiffs Rudd on the 
question of the existence of a right of way of necessity 
(R. 65.). Attention is specifically invited to the fact that 
the Court refused to make a finding that a prescriptive 
right of way had been acquired (R. 54). The finding 
above mentioned pertains to a right of way of necessity 
only. Therefore, the question of a prescriptive right of 
way is not under consideration on this appeal because 
the plaintiffs did not cross appeal on this issue. It is 
manifest from. the foregoing that defendant and appel-
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lant preserved during the course of the trial, its right 
on appeal to assign as error the various actions of the 
court in connection with the matter of a right of way 
ove.r the land which defendant occupied. 
1. The pleadings in this action did not raise 
issues as to the creation of a right of way of necessity 
over and across land of which defendant was in pos-
session for the benefit of land owned by Plaintiffs 
Rudd. Consequently, evidence as to the operation of 
said right 10f way and its existence was inadmissible 
and without the issues of the action. The Finding of 
the Court as to the creation and existence of said 
right of way and the provision of the judgment 
awarding such right of way for the benefit of t!:e 
land owned by plaintiffs Rudd are erroneous in that 
they are not based upon supporting allegations of 
the pleadings. 
There is quoted above the allegations of the com-
plaint which the trial court apparently considered were 
sufficient to raise the issue as to the legal existence of 
this right of way. There is also quoted above the re-
sponses of plaintiffs to the interrogatories propounded 
by defendant and appellant as to the location of said 
right of way and the nature of its obstruction. It is the 
contention of defendant and appellant that the allega-
tions of the complaint, when considered with the re-
sponses to the interrogatories, cannot raise this issue, 
and that the injection of it into the case under the status 
of the pleadings is an error of such weight and import-
ance as to vitiate plaintiffs' judgment. The quantum of 
the evidence presented at the trial by the plaintiffs on 
this subversively raised issue predominated the proceed-
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ing. A reading of the testimony and a study of the evi-
dence is highly convincing that this evidence largely 
entered into the court's ultimate decision not only on the 
question of legal existence of this alleged right of way, 
but as to the overall question of the maintenance of the 
nuisance through the operation of defendant's plant. 
In this connection it is most interesting and prob-
ably determinative to note that in th~ court's pre-trial 
statement and order to which all counsel agreed, and 
particularly counsel for the Rudds, that there is neither 
a suggestion nor an implication that the issues to be tried 
included one as to the legal existence of a right of way 
over the land occupied by defendant and appellant. A 
fair and just consideration of this pretrial statement 
and order compels the conclusion that the introduction 
of this issue into the case came as an afterthought. The 
pretrial order and statement easily mislead counsel for 
defendant and appellant and as soon as the ,purpose and 
direction of evidence as to the right of way became ap-
parent, he commenced his vigorous objections thereto. 
In an action to establish a right of way of necessity 
plaintiff must allege in his complaint the following vital 
facts: 
(a) Conveyance of a described parcel of land to 
him by the defendant or prior owner; 
(b) That defendant or prior owner at time of con-
veyance owned adjacent-la;nd; 
(c) That at time of g-rant to· plaintiff, plaintiff did 
not have, and still has no access from his property to a 
public highway;. 
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(d) That plaintiff's access to his land, and his 
egress therefrom is wholly and completely cut off to his 
irreparable damage; and 
(e) That plaintiff is entitled to a right of way ot 
necessity over lands of defendant to the public road. 
The fundamental rules governing the creation of a 
right of way of necessity and the practice, procedure 
and proof required to establish the same in court, is 
indicated by the following quotations from acknowledged 
authorities: 
"Every· way of necessity is founded on a 
presumed or implied grant. The necessity does 
not in any case create the right. It is only a cir-
cumstance resorted to for the purpose of showing 
the intention of the parties, and raising an impli-
cation of a grant. The right is created by the 
change of ownership of a portion. of an estate,. the 
portion granted having attached to it, by con-
struction as an incident, a right of way over the-
portion not granted. 'Such a way is not created 
by a mere necessity, but always. originates in 
some grant or change of ownership, to which it is 
attached, by construction as a necessary incident, 
pTesumed to have been intended· by the parties. 
• • • A way of necessary can not legally exist, 
where neither the party claiming· the way; nor 
the owner of the land over which. it. is claimed, 
nor any one under whom they or either of them 
claim, was ever seized· of both tracts of lands at 
the same time; and the· way can only· be· created 
when one of the tracts. is. c.onveyed, or the own-
ership changed by operation of law.' Prior unity 
of ownership of the alleged aominanf and servient 
estates is necessary. The implication arises when 
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one grants a piece of land in the midst of his own. 
The grant of a way to reach it is presumed. More-
over, the grantor can not by a subsequent convey-
ance deprive the grantee of the way. The fact 
that there would have been a way of necessity 
in the absence of a grant does not deprive a 
granted right of way of its incidents as a grant." 
(Italics supplied). (Thompson on Real Property, 
Perm. Ed., Volume 2, Section 538, page 132). 
"The foundation of the rule whereby a ,right 
of way of necessity is held to have been impliedly 
granted or reserved in deeds is, that it was the 
intention of the parties to the deed that the 
grantor should convey, and that the grantee should 
acquire, the means of enjoying the land conveyed, 
and, therefore, that he should have access to it 
over other land of the grantor, if the grantee had 
no other means of reaching it. * * *." (Italics 
supplied). (Thompson on Real Property, Perm. 
Ed., Volume 2, Section 539, page 134). 
"* * * A privity of estate must exist between 
the claimant of the way and the owner of the land 
over which the way is claimed. There must have 
been at some prior time a unity of ownership of 
the two estates which have been severed and a 
way of necessity over one created in favor of the 
other. * * *." (Thompson on Real Property, 
Perm. Ed., Volume 2, Section 545, page 143). 
"A way of necessity is an easement arising 
from an implied grant or implied reservation; 
it is the result of the application of the principle 
that whenever a party conveys property, he con-
veys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is neces-
sary for the , beneficial use of land he still pos-
sesses. A way of necessity usually arises where 
there is a conveyance of a part of a tract of land 
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of such nature and extent that either the part 
conveyed or the part retained is entirely sur-
rounded by the land from which it is severed 
or by this land and the land of strangers. It is 
a universally established principle that where a 
tract of land is conveyed which is separated from 
the highway by other lands of the grantor or 
surrounded by his lands or by his and those of 
third persons, there arises, by implication, in 
favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across 
the premises of the grantor to the highway. In 
other words, if one grants a piece of land in the 
midst of his own, he thereby impliedly grants a 
way to reach it. A rule of sound public policy-
namely, that lands should not be rendered unfit 
for occupancy or successful cultivation-supports 
the implied grant or reservation of ways of neces-
sity. These ways are of common-law origin. 
"The fact of the necessity of a way is of great 
importance in determining whether an easement 
of way should be implied. The courts do not 
agree on the degree of necessity requisite to an 
implied grant of a way of necessity. The basis 
of the implied easement is the presumption of a 
grant arising from the circumstances of the case. 
Necessity does not of itself create a right of way, 
but it is said to furnish evidence of the grantor's 
intention to convey a right of way and, therefore, 
raises an implication of grant. This presumption 
of a grant, however, is one of fact and whether 
a grant should be implied depends upon the terms 
of the deed and the facts in each particular case. 
* * *." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 48, pp. 
959-961). 
"The courts are not in complete harmony as 
to the degree of necessity that is required to auth-
orize an implied grant or reservation of a way 
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of necessity. There is abundant authority in sup-
port of the proposition that ways of necessity are 
ways of strict necessity as distinguished from 
ways of n1ere convenience and that the degree of 
necessity requisite to support such a way is abso-
lute necessity, for which inconvenience without 
more does not suffice. * * *." (17 Am. Jur. Ease-
ments, Section 50, pp. 963, 964). 
"A way by necessity is a temporary right in 
the sense that it continues only so long as the 
necessity exists, varies as the necessity varies, 
and ceases to exist upon the termination of the 
necessity which gave rise to it. The necessity 
ceases within this rule upon the acquisition by 
the owner of such right of way of another mode 
of passage to the highway-as, for example, when 
a new public highway is opened to his land or 
when he acquires another way to the highway 
through the purchase of other lands. It has been 
held, however, a right of way by necessity is not 
extinguished by the acquisition of another private 
way of equal convenience." (17 Am. Jur. Ease-
ments, Section 51, p. 965). 
"The rule is that one who claims a way of 
necessity has the burden of proof of the facts 
requisite to an implied grant of an easement of 
this kind-such as the necessity of the way and 
the absence of another way or means of access 
to the property-which he must sustain by com-
petent and sufficient evidence if his claim is to 
be upheld." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 54, 
p. 967). 
"The burden of proving the essential ele-
ments entitling a plaintiff to a way of necessity 
is upon him; that is, to show that the lands con-
veyed to him are surrounded by the lands of the 
grantor, or by the lands of the grantor and others, 
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and that he has no way to reach the public high-
way or road, except through the lands of the 
grantor." (Fox vs. Paul, 158 Maryland 359, 148 
Atl. 809, 68 A.L.R. 520, 524). 
"In an action for injuring or interfering with 
an easement the complaint must allege plaintiff's · 
ownership of the easement in question. Accord-
ing to some decisions it is necessary to set out 
the particular manner, whether by prescription, 
grant, or otherwise by which the title was ac-
quired, although the weight of authority is to the 
contrary, in the absence of some special statutory 
requirement, it being held sufficient to allege gen-
erally plaintiff's right to the easement and a 
violation of this right by defendant. * * •. If the 
complaint is based on the theory that a way in 
controversy is one of strict necessity, the com-
plaint niust show that plaintiff has no access to 
his land from a public highway without going 
over defendant's lands***." (19 C.J. Easements, 
Section 266, p.l000-1001). 
"It is not alleged in the petition that the 
plaintiff has not access to his lands from a county 
or public road or highway, and we cannot assume 
that he has not such access in the absence of some 
allegation to that effect. The allegation that he 
cannot reach either of the county roads mentioned 
in the petition without going through the defend-
ant's fences is. not equivalent to an allegation 
that he has no other means of access to a public 
highway from his lands * * *. It is at least well 
settled that where a party has one way by which 
he can reach a public highway, and which affords 
him reasonable facilities for possessing, using 
and enjoying his own premises, he is not entitled 
to another' way as a way of necessity * * *. The 
facts stated in the amended petition being insuffi-
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:.-· 
cient to entitle the plaintiff to a way of necessity 
for the purpose of ingress to and egress from 
his lands to a highway, the demurrer was properly 
sustained as to that phase of the case." (Mcllqu-
ham vs. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Com-
pany, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 Pac. 20, 21). 
"It is elementary doctrine that a party who 
bases his right upon either adverse user or upon 
dedication by the owner must plead the facts con-
stituting such right or claim • * •. It should re-
quire no argument, however to show that where 
one claims an easement over real property he 
should set forth his claim in apt terms in his 
pleading. In our judgment the allegations in the 
· complaint are clearly insufficient to constitute a 
right to the use of the strip of ground in question 
under the claim of dedication * * *. By again 
referring to the allegations of the complaint 
hereinbefore set forth it will be seen that it is 
not alleged that the alleg:ed use was adverse and 
"QD.der- a claim of right * * *. It is equally ch~ar, 
. therefore, that the facts pleaded are insufficient to 
constitute a right of way by adverse user. The 
court therefore erred in overruling the demurrer 
to the complaint." (Farr vs. Wheelwright Con-
_struction Company, 49 Utah 27 4, 163 Pac. 256, 
257). 
"In a suit to quiet title to an easement, it is 
sufficient to allege ownership generally, and it is 
not necessary to show the particular manner in 
which title was acquired* * *. An allegation that 
plaintiff is the owner of specific real property is 
the averment of an ultimate fact and not a con-
clusion of law* * *. So, likewise, is the allegation 
one of ultimate fact that 'defendant and his pre-
decessors in interest have long since established 
a right of easement in the land of the plaintiff' 
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specifically describing the channel bed of Kay's 
Creek and the adjacent land which it is claimed 
was overflowed and to which defendant claims an 
easement ~ * *. While this is not a model of 
pleading, there are sufficient allegations to with-
stand attack for the first time on appeal * * • ." 
(Robins vs. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 Pac. (2d) 
340-341). 
"• * • and we see no reason why an allega-
tion that the plaintiff is the owner of a described 
right of way or other easement over defendant's 
land, and that such easement is appurtenant 
to plaintiff's land, should not be regarded as a 
sufficient statement of the ultimate facts to be 
established * * *." (Corea vs. Higuera, 153 Cal. 
451, 95 Pac. 882, 17 L.R.A. (NS) 1018). 
The most casual reading of the excerpts from para-
graphs 6, 7 and 8 of plaintiffs' complaint, heretofore 
quoted at pages 12 and 13 of this brief, will show that the 
pleader had no intention of raising an issue concerning 
the legal existence of a right of way over the land occu-
pied by defendant. This statement finds affirmation in 
the prayers of the complaint which read as follows: 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the 
defendant, its officers, servants, and agents be 
permanently restrained, by injunction, from 
maintaining, using, or operating said gravel pit 
and processing plant, and that defendant be re-
quired and ordered by the court to restore all 
right-of-ways, paths, and other means of ingress 
and egress to their premises heretofore destroyed 
by defendant, and be further ordered to restore 
the channel of Cottonwood Creek, to the condition 
that existed prior to defendant's operation of 
said gravel pit, together with damages heretofore 
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incurred thereby. And plaintiffs further pray 
that if, upon the trial of this cause, an order of 
abatement and affirn1ative injunction is not grant-
ed by the court, that the damage of each plain tiff 
be assessed by the court, and judgment rendered 
by the court in favor of each plaintiff for the 
depreciated value or loss in value of the property 
of each plaintiff herein, and for such other and 
further relief in the premises as the court shall 
deem just and proper." (R. 4-5). 
It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiffs 
were only seeking relief from the alleged nuisance created 
by the operations of defendant's sand and gravel plant. 
When reference is made to the Pre-trial Statement and 
Order (R. 30, 31), the foregoing conclusion secures fur-
ther confirmation. The allegations of the complaint and 
the Pre-trial Order proceed on the basic assumption that 
defendant was obstructing roads and lanes appurtenant 
to the plaintiffs' properties, concerning which there was 
no question as to their legal existence. There is not even 
an implication that plaintiffs were giving notice they 
intended in this action to litigate any question concerning 
the legal existence of a right of way, road or lane. The 
responses to def~ndant's interrogatories did not in any 
respect set forth any fact which would inform the de-
fendant that plaintiffs proposed to claim and prove a 
right to use the alleged road described in the response 
of the plaintiffs Rudds by either grant, prescription or 
necessity. The response simply described a road and 
the alleged obstructions thereof. It is a response based 
on the premise of the complaint, and that is, that defend-
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ant was guilty of obstructing legally established roads 
of which plaintiffs were entitled to the free, unobstructed 
use thereof. · 
When the responses to the interrogatories are read 
in connection with the allegations of the complaint it is 
obvious that plaintiff wholly failed to allege any cause of 
action of the nature litigated over defendant's objections. 
The first defect in these allegations is they wholly fail 
to allege that plaintiffs are the owners of a described 
right of way or other easement over the land of which 
defendant was in possession. This pertinent, ultimate 
fact as required by Robins vs. Roberts, supra, and 
Corea vs. Higuera, supra, is entirely lacking, even though 
the response to the interrogatories is considered as part 
of the complaint. The absence of this mandatory alle-
gation of ownership of a right of way or easement neces-
sarily and conclusively implied that the road described 
in the interrogatory was a public road and not one of a 
private nature appurtenant to plaintiffs' land. The ab-
sence of this allegation demonstrates clearly the premises 
upon which plaintiffs' complaint was drafted and ren-
dered findings of fact and the judgment as the same per-
tains to this right of way wholly nugatory and void. 
There exists another fatal defect in plaintiffs' plead-
ings which must be overcome if the finding of the right 
of way of necessity and the judgment thereon are to be 
sustained. Defendant and appellant repeats that the 
court rejected the idea that a right of way by prescrip-
tion had ripened. In its Minute Order of January 23, 
1951 (R·. 54), the court concluded that the use ''was 
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permissive and that no easement ripened by adverse 
use." The findings and judgment show on their face 
that the court adjudicated that a right of way of neces-
sity existed. 
The authorities above quoted demonstrate beyond 
doubt that to entitle a plaintiff to a way of necessity 
he must allege and prove that he has not access to his 
lands from a county, public road or highway. M cllquham 
vs. Livestock Company, supra, teaches that the absence 
of such allegation is fatal. Such allegation is not con-
tained in plaintiffs' complaint nor in the responses of 
plaintiffs, and therefore the court's Finding and judg-
ment are based upon a fatally defective pleading. In 
this connection defendant and appellant repeats that as 
soon as the purpose and direction of plaintiffs' evidence 
as to the road or right of way, became apparent, it 
objected to the admission of such evidence and through-
out the trial it persistently made objection to the court's 
procedure with respect to this matter. 
It is highly illuminating to refer to Hillyer's "Anno-
tated Forms of Pleadings and Practice" (1938 edition). 
In Volume IV. at pages 32-48, is the form of complaint 
(No. 4025) to establish a way of necessity over lands 
of plaintiff's grantor to connect with a public road. 
This form is based upon the case of Gray vs. Magee, 133 
Cal. App. 653, 24 Pac. (2d) 948. In this case the court 
said: 
"A second contention is that the complaint 
is fatally defective because of a misjoinder of 
parties and actions. In this connection it is 
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claimed that an action against Hugh Magee for 
a way of necessity over his land is improperly 
joined with an action against the other defend-
ants to establish the existence of a public road 
over their lands. In order to establish a way of 
necessity over the lands of Hugh Magee, it was 
necessary for the plaintiff to establish that such 
a way would give him access to a public road. 
He could do this only by alleging and proving 
that a public road existed over the estate lands 
which came to the line of Hugh Magee's land. 
Only one cause of action is alleged, and all defend-
ants were proper parties." (Italics supplied). 
(24 Pac. (2d) p. 951). 
Reference is also made to the 1951 Pocket Supple-
ment to Hillyer's accompanying Volume IV. thereof. 
At page 46 of the Supplement (No. 4024-5) is the form 
of a complaint for interference with easement and way 
of necessity. This form is based upon Rose vs. Denn, 
188 Ore. 1, 212 Pac. (2d) 1077; 213 Pac. (2d) 810. This 
case distinguishes between an easement in the form of a 
way of necessity and an implied easement. In the case 
of the former it is absolutely essential for the owner of 
the dominant tenement to allege and prove that such 
way is necessary to afford his lands access to a public 
road. In the absence of such allegation and proof, he 
cannot succeed in establishing a way of necessity. 
When comparison is made of the complaint in this 
action in connection with the responses of plaintiffs to 
the defendant's interrogatories, with the pleadings in 
the Gray and Rose cases, supra, the defects in plaintiffs' 
pleadings in this action become glaring. It is submitted 
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that plaintiffs' pleadings are fatally defective because 
of the absence of the required allegations hereinabove 
discussed. 
The situation therefore presents two different 
aspects. In the event it should be concluded that the 
complaint and responses present an issue as to the exist-
ence of a way of necessity, they are fatally defective 
in that they fail to allege: (1) That plaintiffs are owners 
of an easement or right of way and (2) That they have 
no other rneans of access to a public highway from their 
lands. However, defendant and appellant submits that 
the issue as to the existence of a way of necessity was 
never raised by the complaint and response, and that as 
a result that part of the findings and judgment applic-
able thereto are wholly without any issue framed by the 
pleadings. It is apparent that the plaintiffs face a forked 
road, either branch of which leads to the same destina-
tion. If the pleadings include an issue as to the existence 
of a way of necessity, the complaint and responses 
utterly fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim, 
and as a consequence the pertinent finding and judgment 
are void. If the pleadings do not raise such an issue, 
the pertinent finding and judgment are without support-
ing pleadings. In either event Finding No. 9, and Para-
graph 2 of the Judgment are erroneous and without legal 
effect, and should be so declared. 
Of relevancy to this discussion is the provision of 
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reading as 
follows: 
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"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the P.arties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judg1nent; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the trial 
of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the 
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved there-
by and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or de-
fense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence." 
Continuously through the trial the defendant_ and 
appellant objected to the admission of evidence pertain-
ing to the creation or existence of the alleged right of 
way. Furthermore, defendant and appellant moved to 
strike this evidence both during the trial and at the 
conclusion thereof. In addition, on its motion fora new 
trial and for order amending findings and judgment, it 
again ·attacked the admission of this evidence and the 
trial of any issue involving said right of way. Beyond 
all peradventure, the record on appeal shows that the 
defendant and appellant neither expressly nor impliedly 
consented to the trial of this issue which had not been 
raised by the pleadings or if raised by the complaint 
and responses was defectively stated. Conversely the 
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plaintiffs insisted that the issue was within the pleadings 
and that the pleadings declared a claim on the pretended 
issue. At no time did the plaintiffs request an amend-
ment to their cmnplaint as the same pertained to the 
right of way in question. There is presented to the appel-
late court for consideration a situation (a) where an 
issue was tried which was "not raised by the pleadings"; 
(b) where the defendant and appellant neither expressly 
nor in1pliedly consented to the trial of this issue; (c) 
where plaintiffs and appellees made no offer or request 
to amend their complaint so as to present this issue; (d) 
where the complaint clearly fails to set forth a statement 
of claim to quiet title to a right of way of necessity; (e) 
where the defendant and appell~t continuously objected 
to the trial of such issue and the admission of evidence 
thereon; and (f) where the action of the trial court in 
forcing defendant and appellant to trial upon an issue 
not within the pleadings, or if within the pleadings was 
defectively stated, clearly prejudiced it in maintaining 
its defense. (Cf. Woods vs. Seiber, C.A. 5th, 1949, 171 
Fed. ( 2d) 900. 
Defendant and appellant en1phatically insists that 
the trial court committed prejudicial error in its action 
on this aspect of the case. Under no circumstances can it 
be upheld under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) above 
quoted. If the complaint together with the responses 
to the interrogatories, be construed as raising the issue 
as to the creation and existence of a right of way of 
necessity, plaintiffs must fail because the complaint thus 
construed fails to set forth facts entitling them to relief. 
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If, however, the complaint is construed as defendant and 
appellant believes it should be construed, the court tried 
an issue not within the pleadings and to which the 
defendant and appellant continuously objected. A fatal 
error was therefore committed prejudicing the entire 
defense of defendant and appellant. 
2. There can be no valid adjudication as to the 
existence of a way of necessity without having before 
the court the actual owner of the estate over and 
upon which such way is imvosed. Mary ·Goff Walker, 
the fee title owner of the land upon which said 
burden was imposed by the court's judgment was 
and is not a party to this action. Consequently, the 
adjudication of the court that such way of necessity 
was created and exists is erroneous. 
It was admitted throughout the trial that the defend-
ant and appellant was not the fee simple title owner of 
the land over which plaintiffs' claim a right of way of 
necessity, and further, by virtue of the stipulation, Ex-
hibit VVV, as read in connection with the abstract of 
title (Exhibit QQQ), it clearly appears that Mary Goff 
Walker was at the time of the commencement of this 
action, during the· trial, and at the time of entry of 
judgment, the fee simple owner of the servient tenement. 
The defendant was in possession thereof. under an ar,. 
rangement with Mary Goff Walker, the terms and con-
ditions of which were not revealed at the trial. In its 
pretrial order and statement, the court struck from 
Paragraph 2 of the complaint the following phrase: "and 
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is maintaining on land owned by Mary Goff Walker" 
(R. 31). The plaintiffs consented to the elimination of 
this phrase. 
In an action to determine the existence of a right 
of way of necessity both the owner of the dominant 
estate and the owner- of the servient estate are necessary 
parties thereto and there can be no adjudication as to 
the existence of a right of way of necessity without 
bringing before the court the owner of both the dominant 
and servient estates. The reason for this rule is that 
a right of way of necessity can only exist where there 
was a prior unity of ownership. In such action the lessee 
or tenant of the owner of the servient estate cannot 
represent the fee owner thereof. In this case, Mary 
Goff Walker, is the servient owner and the defendant 
corporation is either her lessee or tenant. The deter-
mination of the issue as to whether the prior owner of 
the Rudd Pedler and the Mary Goff Walker properties 
(Emerette C. Smith) intended by her conveyance to 
Pedlers' and Rudds' predecessors in title to convey a 
right of ingress and egress over the land retained by 
her (now the Mary Goff Walker property) can only be 
adjudicated when the Rudds and Pedlers and the mesne 
grantee of Emerette C. Smith (Mary Goff Walker) are 
before the court. Mary Goff Walker was not served with 
process in this action and did not appear therem. 
"It appears from the evidence that one Too-
hey owns the Toohey lands, in possession of de-
fendants, upon which plaintiff claims an ease-
ment; that is, the right to have the flood waters 
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run over the said lands in the Flannery ditch. 
As to find for the plaintiff it would be necessary 
for the court to conclude that there was such a 
burden upon the said lands, it is apparent that 
such an easement may not be adjudged in a suit 
to which Toohey is not a party." (Italics sup-
plied). 
Campbell v. Flannery, et al., 32 Montana 119, 79 Pac. 
702-704. 
"* * * The answer sets forth and the agreed 
statement of facts shows that the 'other premises' 
of the defendants, across which the plaintiff, by 
the terms of the contract, 'is to have the right 
of way,' were, after the execution of the said con-
tract, conveyed by defendants to one C. D. Good-
rich, without an express reservation of the plain-
tiff's right of way across them. Whether Goodrich 
was put upon inquiry respecting such right of 
way in season to be affected thereby in taking his 
deed from defendants does not appear. Defend-
ants' answer states that the plaintiff 'has been at 
all times and is now permitted to enjoy a right of 
way across these premises at reasonable and 
proper times.' The intended meaning of this 
statement is not clear. If Goodrich was put upon 
inquiry respecting such right of way, then in 
equity he stands no better with reference to it 
than would the defendants, had they retained the 
legal title to the premises * * . * But Goodrich is 
not a party to this suit, as he essentially should be 
if the. decree is to have effective force on all con-
cerned. On remand of this case, the court of 
chancery should refuse. to proceed to make a de-
cree until Goodrich is made a party defendant and 
. given an opportunity to be heard. Story, Eq. Pl., 
.Sec. 75. For upon the result of such a hearing 
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and determination depends the rights of the 
plaintiff as to a right of way according to the 
terms of his contract with defendants, and con-
sequently as to his right to damages against them 
for failure to perform the contract to the full 
extent • • •." 
Peryer v. Pennock, 115 Atl. (Bt.) 105, 17 A.L.R. 
863-865. 
"Where the jurisdiction of equity is invoked 
to determine the right to a way of necessity and 
to locate it if it is found to exist, all persons whose 
rights may be affected by the decision of the ques-
tion raised should be made parties." 
Syllabus, Fox v. Paul, 148 Atl. (Md.) 809, 68 A.L.R. 
520-527. 
"In an action against defendants for ob-
s.tructing an easement on lands in their possession, 
the owner of the land is a necessary party where 
the existence of the easement is in issue, since 
an easement on land may not be adjudged in a 
suit to which the owner of the land is not a party." 
19 C.J., page 1000, Sec. 264. 
"It is the well recognized general rule that 
a tenant has no inherent power to bind the land-
lord or the reversion by any act or contract 
on his part." 
32 Am. ~Jur. Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 77, 
P. 90. (See also Schwer vs. Martin, 29 Ky. Law 
Rep. 1221, 97 S.W.l2, 7 L.R.A. (NS) 614, 616). 
Manifestly, the judgment is not binding on Mary 
·Goff Walker. She was never before the court and insofar 
as she is concerned, the judg1nent is a nullity as the same 
pertains to her land title. (Rule 19 (b), Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure). It is no answer to this proposition 
that plaintiffs are satisfied with an adjudication against 
the defendant and appellant that a way of necessity 
exists, because the defendant and appellant was never 
in a legal position to contest the vital issues involved. 
Only Mary Goff Walker can raise the question as to 
prior unity of ownership; the effect of conveyances by 
Emerette C. Smith to predecessors in title of the plain-
tiffs Rudd and Pedler, and of Mary Goff Walker; the 
question whether said plaintiffs have another access to 
public roads and highways; and whether the necessity 
existed at the time of trial. Insofar as these questions 
are involved, there is no privity between the defendant 
and appellant and Mary Goff Walker which will allow 
the court to pass upon the inherent problems involved 
in adjudicating the existence of a way of necessity. 
Therefore, on this ground, defendant and appellant sub-
mits that the court acted erroneously and such erroneous 
actions contributed to the confusion of issues and re-
sulted in substantial prejudice to defendant's and appel-
lant's defense. 
3. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the 
right or title of the applicant for an injunction to 
protect property, equity will not interfere in the 
absence of an emergency until after the right or title 
has been established at law. 
In considering the above proposition, consideration 
should be given to Rule 2, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which reads as follows: 
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"There shall be one form of action to be 
lmown as 'civil action.," 
and to Rule 8 (e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which reads as follows : 
"A party may set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim or defense alternately or hypo-
thetically, either in one count or defense or in 
separate counts or defenses. When two or more 
statements are made in the alternative and one 
of them if made independently would be sufficient, 
the pleading is not made insufficient by the in-
sufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or on 
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 1L" 
Under these rules a plaintiff may allege in his com-
plaint as many separate claims as he has whether based 
on legal or equitable grounds or both. (Baron and 
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 1, Sec. 
141, Page 266.) 
However, the foregoing rules do not destroy the right 
of trial by jury (Rule 38, Utah Rules of Procedure), and 
the distinction between legal rights and equitable rights 
remain. 
"The question whether a right of way over the 
lands of one person exists in favor of another is 
purely a legal one, and where the existence of 
such an easement is in dispute, the proper tribunal 
in which to settle it is a court of law." (Mason v. 
Ross, 77 N.J. Eq. 527; 77 Atl. 44) 
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"The action is in nature to quiet title. The 
remedy sought is by injunction, and summary. 
The party seeking such relief must show a clear 
right. The exact extent and location of the appel-
lant's right of way, as well as its extent of pos-
session, when this action was instituted, is left 
in doubt by the conflicting testimony. Upon this 
record the relative rights of the parties to this 
contention are in doubt. At least, the case is not 
clear for the appellant. It is not, therefore, one for 
sum1nary equitable intervention." (Newport, etc., 
Turnpike Road Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 
937, 8 s.w. 201). 
"Where, in an action to restrain the obstruc-
tion of a right of way claimed by grant, the de-
fendant not only denied that the plaintiff had a 
legal right of way, for the alleged reason. that the 
deed to the plaintiff's grantor did not convey in 
express terms any interest therein, but denied as 
well the allegation as to obstructing the way and 
consequent damage, and it did not appear that the 
interferences complained o£ were continuous or ir-
reparable, the plaintiff was required first to es~ 
tablish his right in an action at law." (Parks v. 
Parks, 121 Me. 580, 119 Atl. 533). 
"In a suit praying for a judgment that the 
plaintiff was entitled to a right of way from his 
land over that of the defendant to a public high-
way and for an injunction to remove obstructions, 
alleging title by adverse user for the prescriptive 
period, and where the answer denied the plain-
tiff's right and defendant's evidence tended to 
show the user was not adverse, the plaintiff must 
first establish the existence of the right of way 
in a court of law." (Hart v. Leonard, 42 N.J. Eq. 
416, 7 Atl. 865.) 
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"• • • The issue between the parties was 
purely one as to the title to the easement and'"' '"' •. 
although in form this is a suit in equity it is in 
reality an action of ejectment to secure the re-
moval of the respondents and their building from 
the alleged way. The complainant in her bill al-
leges that she is the owner of this right of way and 
that she acquired it by adverse user for more than 
ten years. The respondents in their answer deny 
that there is any such easement appurtenant to 
her land and that the complainant ever acquired 
one by adverse user. '"' • *The only issue left was 
as to the title to the easement. The court of equity 
had no jurisdiction to try this issue and the ·res-
pondents are entitled to have it tried at law before 
a jury." ('\'Vaal v. Sakagi, 27 Haw. 609, 636.) 
See also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 106 Kan. 
823, 189 Pac. 925 ; 
Howell Co. v. Charles Pope Glucose Co., 171 
Ill. 350, 49 N.E. 497; 
Dahnken v. George Romney <t Sons Co., 111 
Utah 4 71, 184 Pac. ( 2d) 211, 215 ; 
McGregor v. Silver King Mining Co., 14 Ut. 
47, 45 Pac. 1091. 
"The primary purpose of the instant case 
is establishment of an easement based upon an 
alleged prescriptive user. If plaintiff fails in this, 
his cause of action falls. The right of injunctive 
relief cannot come into existence until the ease-
ment has been established. This issue the plaintiff 
was entitled to have tried to a jury. The court 
may grant or refuse the auxiliary relief of re-
straining interference therewith after the ease-
ment has been found to exist. Should the jury find 
no easement, under proper instructions of the 
court, insofar as plaintiff is .concerned, both in-
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junctive relief and damages cease to be of any 
consequence. The determination of the issue as to 
whether or not plaintiff has a prescriptive ease-
ment over the lands, the title to which is conceded 
to be in defendants, is one based on fact. The 
question of whether or not the way in question 
has been used for more than 20 years, whether or 
not the use has been open, adverse, continuous, 
visible, notorious, and under claim of right with 
knowledge and acquiescence, and not merely per-
missive or by license, are the basic facts to be 
established, and the plaintiff had a right to have 
them submitted to a jury. 19 C.J. 965, Sec. 199; 
Polson v. Ingram, 22 S.C. 541; Farmer v. Bright, 
183 N.C. 655, 112 S.E. 420 * * *. Whether or not 
the law courts and the esuity courts were separate 
courts, the analogy of the situation is pertinent 
to the issues in the instant case. The necessity of 
establishing the easement at law before equity 
principles or 'equity Jurisprudence,' as distin-
guished by Pomeroy, may be applied to injunctive 
relief, is apparent, although under our procedure 
both may be accomplished in the same action • • •. 
The mere fact that a suit is one to quiet title to 
real property is not controlling. Generally, a suit 
to quiet title to real property is regarded as an 
equitable proceeding; but because it is so regarded 
does not determine the nature of the issue or 
deprive a party of his right to a trial by jury. 
If the only question involved is that of title, the 
issue is generally legal. A suit to establish an 
easement is legal." (Nor back v. Board of Direct-
ors, 84 Utah 506, 37 Pac. ( 2d) 344, 345). 
"By analogy, then, it would seem that where, 
as under our procedure, parties are permitted to 
submit both their legal rights and their equitable 
rights to the same tribunal for adjudication at the 
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same time, the right to a jury trial with respect 
to the former, which was adequately safeguarded 
under the old system, should be equally respected 
under the new. That would seem to be the effect of 
our constitutional guaranty. Article 1, § 7. The 
right to trial by jury thus guaranteed was the 
right as it existed at common law. Koppikus v. 
State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248, 253; 
Cauhape v. Bank, 127 Cal. 197, 202, 59 Pac. 589. 
The purpose of the amendment of 1874 to section 
592 of the Code of Civil Procedure was to make it 
conform thereto. Vallejo, etc., R.R. Co. v. Reed 
Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 556, 147 Pac 238. It 
follows, therefore, that the common-law rule re-
specting the right to trial by jury as it existed 
in 1850 is the rule of decision in this ·state. Pol. 
Code, § 4468 ; Martin v. Superior Court (Sup.) 168 
Pac. 135, 136 L.R.A. 1918B, 313. • • • 
"So far as we have been able to ascertain, 
there was no statutory enactments in England be-
tween 1850 and 1858 affecting the right of trial 
by jury in connection with suits to abate nuisances. 
These decisions may be taken then as determina~ 
tive of the proposition that, under the English 
common law as it stood in 1850, at the time it was 
adopted as the rule of decision in this state, 'If a 
plaintiff applies for an injunction to restrain a 
violation of a conunon-law right, if either the 
existence of the right or the fact of the violation 
be disputed, he must establish that right at law'; 
or, in other words, by a jury, if one be demanded. 
We conclude, therefore, th.at the parties here were 
entitled to a jury trial upon the issues as to dam~ 
ages, and that the verdict of the jury thereon was 
binding. We do not regard the provision of sec-
tion 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure as in any 
way affecting that right. If the jurisdictions in 
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la~ and equity were here separately vested, it 
m1ght well be held that the plaintiff, by filing in 
equity a complaint such as is here presented, had 
thereby elected to submit all the issues for deter-
mination by the court, and thereby waived his 
right to a jury trial on the legal issues; but where, 
as here, all such issues may be tried in the one ac-
tion, no reason for such holding appears." (Farre~l 
v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 Pac. 740-
742.) 
"The decision in Farrell v. City of Ontario, 
supra, was followed and approved only a few 
weeks later by the case of Franklin v. Southern 
Pacific Company, 40 Cal. App. 31, l80 P. 76, in 
which likewise the judgment of the trial court waa 
reversed. The decision in this later case was by 
the same court which rendered the decision in the 
case of Farrell v. City of Ontario, supra. A peti-
tion for a hearing after said decision was denied 
by the Supreme Court. It is interesting to note 
that the author of the opinion in the first of these 
two cases, was the trial judge in the later case. 
• * • In our opinion, the argument and presenta-
tion of authorities cited by Judge Myers in his 
opinion rendered in the Farrell case, are un-
answerable and the rule therein announced should 
be followed by the courts of this state in actions 
wherein both legal and equitable remedies are the 
subject of the action." (Pacific Western Oil Co. 
v. Bern Oil Co., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 60, 87 Pac. 
(2d) 1045-1050.) 
"Thus we conclude that the court below erred 
in not according to the defendant,. upon his de-
mand, a jury trial on the issue of damages. As 
has been seen, the trial judge denied the defend-
ant the right to a jury trial on any and all issues 
on the ground that the paramount object of the 
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plaintiff's action was to secure an injunction and 
that the claim for damages was· but incidental to 
the injunctive relief sought. In so ruling, the court 
apparently relied upon Norback v. Board of Di-
rectors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 
37 P. 2d 339, 345, where the rule was laid down 
that 'if the issues are legal or the. major issue 
legal, either party is- entitled upon proper demand 
to a jury trial; but, if the. issues are .. equitable or 
the major issues·. to be resolved. by· an application 
of equity, the. legal issues being merely subsidiary, 
the action should be regarded as equitable and the 
rules of equity apply.' In that case suit was 
brought by the plaintiff to establish a claimed 
easement based upon an alieged prescriptive user, 
for an order enjoining the defendant from assert-
ing a claim as against.the plaintiff thereto,. and for 
damages. The. court. held that the primary purpose 
·of the suit was to establish an easement; that a 
suit to establish an easement by· prescription is-
legal; . that the right of injunctive relief c:ould 
not come. into existence until the. easement. had. 
been established; that the court could grant or 
refuse to grant the auxiliary relief of restraining 
interference with the easement after the easement 
had been found to exist; and that. therefore tha 
parties were. entitled to have the; matter of whether 
he. had acquired an easement by prescription. sub-
mitted to a jury. 
"Appraised in light of the California rule, 
[Farrell and Pacific Western cases, supra J the 
Norberg case is· apparently correct in result; hut 
the· rule· there laid down as. to when litigants~ are. 
entitled to a trial by jury; which we· have. quoted 
above, cannot be reconciled with the California 
rule which we have approved and adopted in this 
· opinion. There may be certain types of cases;· ai-
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though none occur to us now, in which the issues 
of fact in the legal cause of action are so inter-
twined with the issues of fact in the equitable 
cause of action that they cannot be separated for 
the purpose of trial by jury. Only then- would 
it seem that the court should determine whether 
the major issue or issues are legal or equitable 
and grant or deny a jury trial accordingly. Other-
wise the parties should be entitled to a jury trial 
on the issues of fact in the legal cause of action." 
(Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, ...... Utah ...... , 225 
Pac. (2d) 739, 750.) 
The trial proceedings in this case deprived the de-
f~ndant of the right to demand a trial by jury_ of the 
legal issue as to the existence of the right of way of 
necessity. It is true that defendant did not demand a 
trial by jury on this issue but the reason for such lack of 
demand becomes obvious when consideration is given to 
the position which defendant was compelled to take at 
the trial. Had defendant demanded a jury trial on this 
issue, it would have impliedly consented to the trial of_a 
non-pleaded issue, under Rule 15 (h) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. When the Court overruled its objections to 
the admission of evidence concerning the right of way 
and denied its motions to strike such evidence, it ~as not 
only committing error with respect to procedural and 
eVidentiary measures but also by its ruling itdenied the 
defendant its constitutional right to demand a jury trial 
on the legal issue~ Stated otherwise, if defend&nt and 
appellant had demanded a jury trial it would have done 
so at the cost of waiving its contention that the issue 
concerning the way of necessity had not been pleaded. 
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It was in truth compelled to surrender its right of jury 
trial in order to preserve its contention that it was being 
forced to trial on a non-pleaded issue. Defendant con-
tends that its rights were radically and seriously preju-
diced when it was forced to make this election, and that 
the errors of the court with respect to defendant's objec-
tions and motions penetrated deeply into defendant's 
defense of all issues involved in the case. It is impossible 
in a post-examination of the record to determine what 
the results would have been had the defendant been 
accorded its free election to try the legal issues before a 
jury upon a complaint which contained proper allegations 
as to the creation and existence as to the way of necessity. 
4. The writ of injunction cannot be used to try 
title to real estate or an interest there·n. It is not 
the province of an injunction to effect a final adjudi-
cation of an alleged right based on a disputed title. 
It cannot be used to oust one party from possession 
of realty and place another person in possession 
thereof. 
"Since ordinarily an injunction will not lie as 
an original and independent proceeding to deter-
mine the title to land and is not a proper substi-
tute for an action of ejectment or forcible entry 
and detainer, in the absence of some statutory 
provision to the contrary, the rule is that an in-
junction will not issue, the effect of which will be 
to take land out of possession of one party and put 
it in possession of another, at least until complain-
ant's title has been established at law. • • •." (32 
C.J. Sec. 178 (3), page 134.) 
"Upon the facts found, this case was pre-
sented to the lower court. The plaintiffs, purchas-
67 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ers, never were in the actual or exclusive posses-
sion of the lands to be covered by the lease. The 
society, the vendor, was in actual and exclusive 
possession when it planted the crops in contro-
versy and continued in possession of the lands 
upon which those crops were growing until the 
injunction was issued and served. The practical 
effect of the injunction as issued was to oust the 
society from its possession and install the plain-
tiffs in possessfon, and for such a purpose injunc-
tion is not an available remedy." (194 Pac. p. 142) 
(Blinn v. Hutterische Society, 58 Mont. 542, 194 
Pac. 140, 142). 
"The purpose of this action is not to maintain 
a status quo while rights are litigated. Its sole 
purpose is to finally adjudicate an alleged right 
based upon a doubtful and disputed title. This 
is not the province of injunction. 32 C.J. p. 35, 
Sec. 15. In fact, its true purpose is to try title. 
Where such is the main object of a 'suit, injunction 
is not the proper remedy. Tomasini v. Taylor, 
et al., 42 Or. 576, 72 P. 324." (Barrios v. Pleasant 
Valley, etc., Co., 17 Pac. ( 2d) (Colo.) 301.) 
"This case in our opinion is on all fours with 
Smith v. Gardner, 12 Or. 221, 6 Pac. 771, 53 Am. 
Rep. 342, which was a suit to enjoin a trespass 
upon real property, wherein the defendant justi-
fied on the ground that the place where the tres-
pass was. committed was a public highway .. The 
court held that the manifest object of the suit 
was to determine whether a highway existed 
.. across the lands of the plaintiff, and that equity 
did not have jurisdiction to try and determine that 
question, but plaintiff's remedy was at law. The 
same question is presented here, and it is a matter 
of no consequence that in the case cited the high-
way was claimed by dedication, and in this by 
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prescription. The decree of the court below is 
therefore affirmed." (Tomasini v. Taylor, 43 Ore. 
4, 72 Pac. 324.) 
"The law is well settled that a court of equity 
will not interfere by injunction with the possession 
of a party for the purpose of transferring the pos-
session to another." (Montgomery v. Coleman-
Nelson Gasoline Co., 130 Old. 14, 264 P. 895; 
Bradham V· Johnson, 195 Old. 275, 156 Pac. (2d) 
806, 808.) 
Paragraph 2 of the judgment beyond doubt places 
the plaintiffs Rudds in possession of part of the land 
of which defendant held possession. The court "granted" 
a right of way as against this defendant to the Rudd 
premises from a public highway; said right of way is 
to be of such size, condition and extent as to be suitable 
for use by motor vehicles. The defendant, its officers, 
servants, agents and assignees are enjoined front 
interferring with or obstructing said right of way (R. 
59). 
Defendant requotes for purposes of emphasis the 
statement of the Utah Supreme Court contained in the 
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, supra; wherein the court 
was considering Norback v. Board of Directors, supra. 
It said: 
"The court held that the primary purpose of 
the suit was to establish an easement; that a suit 
to establish an easement by prescription is legal. 
That the right of injunctive relief could not come 
into existence until the easement had been estab-
lished; that the court could grant and refuse to 
grant auxiliary relief of restraining interference 
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·with the easement after the easement had been 
found to exist; and that therefore, the parties 
were entitled to have the matter of whether he 
had acquired an easement by prescription sub-
mitted to.a jury." (225 Pac. (2d) 750.) 
The complaint in this action sought an injunction 
restraining defendants from obstructing roads and lanes. 
On that facet of the case it was purely equitable because 
the complaint utterly failed to make any· allegations of 
the plaintiff's ownership of a way of necessity. As pre-
viously stated the premise of the complaint is that de-
fendant was obstructing roads and lanes which had both 
legal and factual existence, and which required no court 
action to establish or vindicate. The plaintiffs asked the 
court to protect their legal right to have legally estab-
lished roads and lanes kept open to free use by them. 
The case made by the complaint and responses to the 
interrogatories stops at that point. The effect however 
of Paragraph 2 of thejudgment is to "grant" plaintiffs, 
Rudds, a way of necessity over lands of which defend-
ant held possession. This provision of the judgment is 
a certain and clear violation of the rule that the writ of 
injunction is a preventitive remedy only and cannot be 
used to try title. The plaintiffs devoted days of trial to 
proving the legal right of the plaintiffs to a right of way 
when they came into court only asking it to enjoin de-
fendant from obstructing legally established roads and 
lanes. It is difficult to conceive of a more violent case of 
"government by injunction" than this one. It has all the 
evils against which the courts and legal profession have 
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protested in connection with the use of the writ of in-
junction. On this basis the provisions of Paragraph 2 of 
the judgment are erroneous and should be so declared. 
5. A right of way of necessity exists only so long 
as the necessity exists. When the necessity ceases, 
the way terminates. Under the state of the pleadings 
and trial procedure followed in this case, the issue 
concerning the existence of a present necessity with 
respect to the Rudd property could not be properly 
presented to the court. Its finding on this issue is not 
supported by pleading which raised this issue and is 
therefore a finding without the issues of the case. 
Defendant and appellant never agreed to the trial 
of such issue, but objected to and protested against 
not only the admissitm of evidence on this issue, but 
also of the trial of such issue. 
A right of way of necessity over another's land to 
a public highway ceases with the necessity which gave 
rise to it. 
"A way of necessity arises from necessity 
alone and continues only while the necessity ex-
ists. Unquestionably appellant had a way of neces-
sity across his grantor's ranch until a road was 
dedicated to his use; but when that was done his 
right to a way of necessity ceased and it matters 
not that the old road was more convenient for 
his purposes. When it ceased to be indispensable, 
the right ceased." (Cassin v. Cole, 153 Cal. 677, 
96 Pac. 277, 278.) 
"A way created by necessity cannot endure 
longer than the cause which calls it into being, and 
it is consequently extinguished on the acquisition 
of another mode of passage although far less con-
venient." (9 R.C.L. 815, 816.) 
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"No implications of a grant of a right of way 
can arise from proof that the land granted cannot 
be conveniently occupied without it; its foundation 
rests in necessity, not in convenience. A party 
cannot have a way of necessity through the land 
of another when the necessary way to the highway 
can be obtained through his own land, how~ver 
convenient and useful another way might be * * *" 
(19 C.J. 115, P. 922.) 
"A way by necessity is a temporary right in 
the sense that it continues only so long as the 
necessity exists, varies as the necessity varies, 
and ceases to exist upon the termination of the 
necessity which gave rise to it." (17 Am. Jur. 
Easements, Sec. 51, P. 965.) 
"A right of way which exists by necessity is 
based upon an implied grant, and a way of neces-
. sity is provisionally brought into existence by the 
necessities of the estate granted. And, if the 
grantee has a new way to the estate previously 
reached by the way of necessity, the way of neces-
sity is thereby extinguished. * * * A right of way 
of necessity is not a perpetual right. It ceases to 
exist when the necessity for its continuance 
ceases." (Waubun Beach Assoc. v. Wilson, 
(Mich.), 265 N.W. 474, 103 A.L.R. 983-989.) 
A complete annotation covering the question of 
cessation- of easement of way by necessity upon cessa-
tion of necessity appears in 103 A.L.R., page 993. 
If plaintiffs Rudds ever had a way of necessity upon 
or over the lands of which defendant and appellant was 
in possession, the question as to whether the necessity 
for such way had ceased was never properly presented 
to the court because of the lack of appropriate pleadings 
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covering the question as to a way of necessity. Defend-
ant and appellant has hereinbefore shown the status 
of the pleadings at'1.d has demonstrated that they were 
wholly inadequate to allow the court to pass upon this 
question. The immediate quotations above support the 
proposition that one of the vital elements in a case in-
volving a way of necessity is not only the issue as to the 
existence of the necessity when the way was created, 
but the continuance of the necessity at the time of trial 
and at the date of the judgment decreeing the same. With-
out pleadings which definitely raised all issues of fact 
inherent in such litigation, it was impossible for the de-
fendant to present an adequate defense on this issue. A 
reading of the evidence as the same pertains to the right 
of way makes it clear that the plaintiffs were primarily 
concerned with establishing a right of way by prescrip-
tion (which effort wholly failed) and the question of the 
existence of a way of necessity came as an afterthought 
because of the court's rulings which defendant and ap-
pellant continuously controverted. Regardless of the evi-
dence submitted, the defendant and appellant was pre-
judiciously handicapped in making its defense that a 
necessity no longer existed for the right ofway. Without 
an accurate issue on this question of the continuance of 
the necessity, the evidence is utterly lacking in probative 
force to sustain the finding of a present necessity. The 
evidence pertaining to present necessity is uncohesive, 
scattered, and lacks definiteness. Such condition of the 
evidence is resultant upon the lack of a definite issue. 
Defendant and appellant submits that it was not only 
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handicapped in presenting the defense of lack of present 
necessity, but also that this lack of definiteness on this 
issue served to prejudice its entire defense in the princi-
pal cause. 
n. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOW-
ING PLAINTIFFS TO SERVE AND FILE AN 
AMENDMENT TO THEIR COMPLAINT WHICH 
INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS CHARGING DEFEND-
ANT WITH MAINTAINING A NUISANCE AT-
TRACTIVE TO CHILDREN, AND ALSO COMMIT-
TED ERROR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
IN PROOF OF SUCH ALLEGATIONS. 
1. The doctrine of attractive nuisance is 
part of the law of negligence and defines the 
duty of the owner or occupant of real property 
to guard against the existence or maintenance 
on his property of instrumentalities or con-
ditions which are attractive to trespassing or 
meddl!ng children of tender age. The doctrine 
has no applicati,on in the present action which 
is to enjoin or restrain the operations of a law-
ful business on the the ground that said opera-
tions create a condition which annoys plain-
tiffs and interferes with their rrghtful use of 
their property. 
The doctrine of "attractive nuisance" is elucidated 
by the following authorities. 
"The appellant contends that it was not guilty 
of negligence in thus maintaining· upon its own 
premises, for necessary use in conducting its busi-
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ness, the turn-table in question, and which was 
fastened in the usual and customary manner of 
fastening such tables; that the plaintiff was 
wrongfully upon its premises, and therefore a 
trespasser, to whom the defendant did not owe the 
duty of protection from the injury received, and 
that the court should have so declared, and non-
suited the plaintiff • • •. It is a maxim of the 
law that one must so use_ and enjoy hi~ property 
as to interfere with the comfort and safety of 
others as little as possible consistently with its 
proper use. This rule, which only imposes a just 
restriction upon the owner of property, seems not 
to have been given due consideration in the case 
referred to. But this principle, as a standard of 
conduct, is of universal application, and the fail-
ure to observe it is, in respect to those who have 
a right to invoke its protection, a breach of duty, 
and in a legal sense, constitutes negligence • • •. 
If defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated 
that, leaving this turn-table unguarded and ex-
posed, an injury, such as plaintiff suffered, was 
likely to occur, then it must be held to have antici-
pated it, and was guilty of negligence in thus 
maintaining it in its exposed position. It is no 
answer to this to say that the child was a tres-
passer, and if it had not intermeddled with de-
fendant's property it would not have been hurt, 
and that the law imposes no duty upon the de-
fendant to make its premises a safe playing 
ground for children. In the forum of law, as well 
as of common sense, a child of immature years is 
expected to exercise only such care and self-re-
straint as belongs to childhood, and a reasonable 
man must be presumed to know this, and the law 
requires him to govern his actions accordingly. 
It is a rna tter of common experience that children 
of tender years are guided in their actions by 
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childish instincts, and are lacking in that discre-
tion which, in those of more mature years, is 
ordinarily sufficient to enable them to appreciate 
and avoid danger; and in proportion to this lack 
of judgment on their part, the care which must 
be observed towards them by others is increased; 
and it has been held in numerous cases to be an 
act of negligence to leave unguarded and exposed 
to the observation of little children dangerous 
and attractive machinery, which they would nat-
urally be tempted to go about or upon, and against 
the danger of which action their immature judg-
ment interposes no warning or defense." (Bar-
rett v. Southern Pacific Company, 91 Cal. 296, 
27 Pac. 666). 
"The owner of a thing dangerous and attrac-
tive to children is not always and universally 
liable for an injury to a child tempted by the 
attraction. His liability bears a relation to the 
character of the thing, whether natural and com-
mon, or artificial and uncommon, to the com-
parative ease or difficulty of preventing the dan-
ger without destroying or impairing the useful-
ness of the thing, and, in short, to the reasonable-
ness and propriety of his own conduct, in view 
of all surrounding circumstances and conditions. 
As to common dangers existing in the order of 
nature, it is the duty of parents to guard and warn 
their children, and, failing to do so, they should 
not expect to hold others responsible for their 
own want of care. But, with respect to dangers 
specially created by the act of the owner, novel 
in character, attractive and d3..ngerous to children, 
easily guarded and rendered safe, the rule is, as 
it ought to be, different." (Peters v. Bowman, 115 
Cal. 356, 47 Pac. 599, 14 L.R.A. (NS) 626). 
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"We have already pointed out that, as to 
adults or children who may come upon another's 
premises either by express or implied invitation, 
the law imposes the duty upon the owner to exer-
cise .reasonable care for their safety. If, there-
fore, the owner places something upon his prem-
ises which is easily accessible to children, and 
which is alluring and attractive to their childish 
propensities, and excites their curiosity and de .. 
sire for play, it, in effect, amounts to an implied 
invitation to them to come upon the premises. If, 
in connection with the attractiveness, the thing 
is inherently dangerous to a child of immature 
judgment, it may well be that the owner of prem-
ises may, under particular circumstances, be held 
liable for his neglect of duty to the child going 
thereon by reason of such allurement." (Brown 
v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570, 14 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 619, 626). 
"In a number of jurisdictions the rule of non-
liability to infant trespassers is subject to a well 
recognized exception, consisting of a doctrine 
variously termed the 'attractive nuisance,' 'at-
tractive agencies,' 'attractive instrumentalities' 
or 'turntable' doctrine, or the doctrine of the 
'turntable cases,' or of the 'torpedo cases.' This 
doctrine imposes liability for injuries to children, 
even though they are technical trespassers, where 
such injuries are the result of the failure of the 
owner or person in charge to take proper pre-
cautions to prevent injuries to children by instru-
mentalities or conditions which he should, in the 
exercise of ordinary judgment and prudence know 
would naturally attract them into unsuspected 
danger. The doctrine originated in an English 
case in which one who left a horse . and cart un-
attended on the street was held liable for an injury 
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received by a child while playing on the cart, but 
has since been extended far beyond the strict 
legal principles involved in that case. In the 
United States the doctrine is designated the 'turn-
table' doctrine or the doctrine of the 'turntable 
cases,' because the leading American case on 
the subject, in which the doctrine was first recog-
nized by the supreme court of the United States, 
involved an injury to a child playing about a 
railroad turntable." ( 45 C.J., Sec. 155, Page 758). 
The "attractive nuisance" idea was introduced by 
the plaintiffs into this case upon the direct examination 
of the witness Pherrel Draper, one of the plaintiffs. 
The following is an excerpt from the proceedings: 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) I will ask 
you, Mr. Draper, if you have seen children 
in and around and about this plant~ 
A. Yes. 
GENERAL RITER: Now, I move-I object 
to that. That is immaterial, it is an immaterial 
thing in this issue certainly whether there are 
children in and around and about the plant. He 
is not standing here as a Juvenile Court pro-
tecting children. 
MR. J. RICHARD 1\1:ULLINER: I would 
like to be heard. 
THE COURT: Do you claim an attractive-
ness? 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: That is one 
feature. 
GENERAL RITER: You haven't pleaded 
it, and it is in violation of the cases~ 
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~IR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: This is my 
theory on it. 
(Arguments of Counsel). 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I will tie 
this in with other witnesses. 
THE COURT : I think you ought to plead it 
if you do. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I will ask 
to amend if it isn't pleaded. 
GENERAL RITER: What is the theory, it is 
an attractive nuisance for children Y You can't 
raise that. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to 
show the people involved in this neighborhood 
have children, and there will be other children, 
too, who play in and about these sand piles and 
conveyors which present a very dangerous situa-
tion which has upset the parents of these children 
living there, and an attractive nuisance is a nui-
sance in and of itself. 
GENERAL RITER: The attractive nuisance 
doctrine has no place in this case. That was a 
doctrine which was introduced purely on a per-
sonal injury claim between an injured child and 
a dead child and the defendant. It certainly has 
no business in a private nuisance case. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: The pos-
sibility of this nuisance and attraction I would 
like to raise here if it hasn't been raised. 
THE COURT: Can you file your amend-
ment tomorrowY 
~1R .. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I think so. 
I will file it before we recess. 
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THE COURT: I think you ought to file it 
early. I don't like to try cases without issues. 
Suppose you take until Wednesday. The plain-
tiffs are granted until Wednesday morning to file 
an amendment with reference to the attractive 
nuisance feature. 
GENERAL RITER: May the record show 
that on the assumption it is filed, I move to strike 
it on the ground it is an irrelevant and immate-
rial allegation in this type of action and object 
to any allegation based on that type of allegation. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: In connec-
tion with this, rather than recopy the whole com-
plaint can I add a paragraph numbered according 
to the grounds in that general paragraph~ 
THE COURT: The last question please. 
(The last question was read by the Reporter). 
THE COURT: The objection to the question 
is overruled and the answer may stand. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) How often 
generally would you say you had seen them? 
A. I can't say just how often I have seen them 
there playing out on the ends of those high 
conveyors, and also two or three times I have 
taken the little children off of those sand 
piles all over that large underground con-
veyor and warned them of the danger there 
would be if they would ever slip into that 
cone. It would mean certain death. I have 
taken them off two or three· different times. 
GENERAL RITER: That is a highly pre-
judicial line of testimony, and I object to it, if 
. the Court please, what this witness did (R. 206-
209). 
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Pursuant to the permission of the court as set forth 
in the above quoted excerpt, the plaintiffs served and 
filed (R. 312) an amend1nent to their complaint reading 
in part as follows : 
"That the various operations as described and . 
the piling and the piles of sand and gravel con-
stitute an attraction and attractive nuisance and 
the loading and caving in are a serious danger to 
children who are attracted thereto, which inter-
feres with the safe and comfortable enjoyment of 
plaintiffs' properties and lessen the personal en-
joyment thereof by plaintiffs or others residing 
therein. That the conditions caused and as in this 
Paragraph 8 referred to are offensive to the 
senses and injurious to the health of the occu-
pants of the properties of plaintiffs as herein 
described and involved (R. 35-36). 
Defendant objected to the filing of this amendment 
to plaintiffs' complaint (R. 312-313). The court over-
ruled the objection (R. 313) and the defendant served 
and filed its answer to this amendment wherein it denied 
the allegations thereof (R. 49-50). 
Thereafter during the course of the trial the plain-
tiffs persisted in the introduction over defendants ob-
jection of evidence in support of this attractive nuisance 
theory. Upon the direct examination of Virginia Pedler, 
one of plaintiffs' witnesses, the following episode occur-
red: 
Q. Have you observed children playing on these 
conveyors and sand piles on the '\V alker prop-
erty? 
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GENERAL RITER: Consistent with my 
previous objection, I object to that question. 
THE COURT: The record may show an ob-
jection to the entire line of attractive nuisance 
questions, and the objection is overruled. 
A. Yes, I have seen them. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) On more 
than one occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And over what period, Mrs. Pedler? 
A. I don't remember exactly. I have seen them 
several times. I couldn't say at just what 
times. They were usually there on a Sunday 
afternoon. 
Q. Has it been from 1948, did you observe chil-
dren out there in that year~ 
A. Yes. I brought my own children back from 
there that year. 
Q. And in 1949' 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in 1950 t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has there been more than one occasion in 
each of these periods you have seen children 
out there~ 
A. Yes, I have seen boys out on the end of the 
conveyors, and I have also seen children on 
the piles of material. 
Q. And on occasion you have seen your own chil-
dren over there 1 
A. Yes, the first year in particular it was quite 
an attraction for them down there; and when-
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ever they were m1ss1ng, that was the first 
place we would head by. We have swings 
in our place since then to a void this ( R. 489-
490). 
When the witness Jack C. Dunn, also a plaintiff, was 
on the stand, the following examination ensued: 
Q. Have you ever observed children playing on 
these sand piles and conveyors at this Walker 
plant! 
A. Yes, I have, particularly my own observation, 
which I called at times to my father to come-
GENERAL RITER: Now if the Court please, 
here comes this attractive nuisance question 
again. 
THE COURT: You may have your objec-
tion. It is overruled. 
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: Would you 
read as far as he has gone. 
(The last answer was read by the Reporter). 
THE COURT : Don't tell the conversation, 
but just tell what you t5aw. 
A. (Continuing) I happened to see some young-
sters that I would judge from where I was 
standing they were about eight to ten years 
of age, at the end of the longest conveyor. 
One of them was standing, I should say, well, 
I won't give the details. But they were look-
ing, the youngster was looking over at the 
cone of dirt below, and there was another 
youngster, I should say, half way out of the 
conveyor back of it. At that time I did ask 
a question on the fact there should be a night 
watchman or a day watchman there to keep 
youngsters off of it. 
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GENERAL RITER: I move to strike that 
out. 
THE COURT: The motion is granted. The 
answer is stricken. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Do you have 
children' 
A. Yes, I have one boy (R. 550-551). 
Ernest J. Pedler, one of the plaintiffs was permitted 
over defendant's objections to testify as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Have you 
ever seen children playing on the Walker 
piles and equipment~ 
A. Yes, sir; I have. 
GENERAL RITER: Now I would like my 
objection that I have had right from the begin-
ning to that type of question. 
THE COURT: The record may show you 
have your objection to this line of testimony. 
Objection overruled. 
THE WITNESS.: On two occasions I have 
gone over and pulled my youngest girl from the 
closest pile of sand there. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) And on other 
occasions have you seen other children play-
ing? 
A. I have witnessed older boys, perhaps four-
teen or fifteen years of age, and I am guess-
ing some on that, but I have witnessed them 
out on the end of the conveyors on a Sunday 
( R. 620-621). 
The doctrine of attractive nuisance operates under 
the law of negligence. It is a legal fiction invented by 
the courts to reach a situation where immature children 
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enter upon property of the defendant and are either 
injured or killed. The children in such instances are 
technical trespassers, but the hardship of visiting upon 
them the rule which is applicable to adults and mature 
persons is obvious. Consequently, the courts conceived 
the idea that if a property owner knowingly and inten-
tionally created on his premises a situation which usually 
attracts children to come upon the premises and play, 
the property owner had really invited them to come on 
his premises. This allowed the courts to consider the 
children as invitees and not trespassers and thereby 
mitigated the operation of the rule that: 
w• • • no duty exists toward a trespasser 
except to refrain from willfully or wantonly 
injuring him, and the owner or person in charge 
of property is not under any duty to protect 
trespassers thereon from injury or to prevent 
them from getting into a place or situation of 
danger. Accordingly, under ordinary circum-
stances, there is no liability for injury to a tres-
passer of whose presence the person whose act 
or omission caused the injury, was unaware." 
(45 C.J., Sec. 132, P. 742~744). 
The term "attractive nuisance" is. a misnomer. It 
is not a term of legal art. More correctly the doctrine 
should be denominated as that pertaining to "attractive 
agencies" or "attractive instrumentalities" ( 45 C.J., Sec. 
155, P. 758). The doctrine is not part of the law of nui-
sance under Sections 103-41-1 and 104-56-1, Utah Code, 
1943. Therefore the admission of this evidence consti-
tutes an error. 
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While the court made no specific finding covering 
this proposition, the filing of plaintiffs' amendment to 
their complaint and the introduction of evidence based 
on this amendment, with the court's full approbation 
and approval, must have influenced the court in making 
the finding : 
"That the maintenance and operation of said 
gravel pit and processing plant is a nuisance, and, 
if continued, will- result in substantial and per-
manent damage to the lands, homes, personal 
properties and health of plaintiffs and result 
further in the substantial depreciation of their 
said prop·erties and prevents the use and enjoy-
ment thereof and destroys the rental and market 
value thereof." (Finding; R. 65). 
Considering the fact that on the principal issue of 
the case, there was a sharp conflict in the evidence and 
the duty was thereby cast upon the court to resolve this 
conflict, the admission of this evidence was extremely 
.. . . . ' 
harmful to the defendant and on appeal should be taken 
into consideration in measuring the court's findings of 
fact and provisions of its judgment relevant to the charge 
that defendant's _operation of its gravel plant consti-
tutes a nuisance. 
DI. 
THE BUSINESS OF EXCAVATING ROCK, 
GRAVEL, AND SAND BY THE OWNER OR OCCU-
PANTS OF LANDS BELONGING TO HIM OR IN 
HIS OCCUPANCY IS A LAWFUL· AND USEFUL 
OCCUPATION. IT IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE. 
A JUDGMENT ENJOINING AND RESTRAINING 
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THE OPERATION OF SUCH BUSINESS SHOULD 
GO NO FURTHER THAN TO CONTROL THOSE 
PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS 
WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL IN-
JURY TO ADJOINING PROPERTY OR TO PER-
SONS RESIDING OR OWNING PROPERTY IN THE 
NEAR VICINITY OF THE LAND UPON WHICH 
THE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED. 
As a preliminary to the discussion of the above 
point, defendant submits relevant and appropriate exw 
cerpts from decisions and textbooks as to the function 
and duty of the trial court in promulgating its judg-
ment wherein and whereby the operations of a business 
are restrained or restricted in cases where the plain-
tiffs assert such operations constitute a private nuisance. 
" (d) Every order granting an injunction 
and every restraining order shall be specific in 
terms ; shall describe in reasonable detail, and 
not by reference to the complaint or other docu-
ment, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and 
is binding only upon the parties to the action, 
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons in active con-
cert or participation with them who receive actual 
notice· of the order by personal service or other-
wise." (Rule 65A(d) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure). 
"Rule 65(d), prescribing the form and scope 
of an injunction or restraining order, is man-
datory, and emergency conditions do not warrant 
a departure from its express requirements. How-
ever, a violation of these provisions will not in-
variably render an order absolutely void. 
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If Rule 65 is obeyed, the court may grant an 
injunction in broad terms, especially if the public 
interest is involved. In such a case, it has even 
. been held that the violations of law not alleged 
may be enjoined although this should be done 
only in exceptional circumstances. 
"Reasons for granting an injunction must be 
stated, and the act.s enjoined must also be speci-
fied. It is insufficient to enjoin a defendant from 
violations 'as charged in .the complaint.' It is 
also insufficient merely to. incorporate long and 
verbose findings; since the order should furnish 
the defendant with a direct and succinct state-
ment of his alleged wrongful acts." (Sec. 1436, 
P. 314-315, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, Vol. 3). 
"* * * No authority is required to support 
the proposition that the business of excavating 
rock and gravel by the owner from lands belong-
ing to him is a lawful and useful occupation, and 
cannot be prohibited by legislation except in cases 
where the enactment of such legislation may be 
found necessary for the protection of the legal 
rights of others." (People v. Hawley, et al., 207 
Cal. 395 ; 279 ·Pac. 137, 144). 
"* * * Applying these well-recognized prin-
ciples to the ordinance before us, we are unable 
to perceive any ground upon which it may be 
sustained as a legitimate. exercise of the police 
power. It is in no sense a mere regulation as to 
the manner in which rock or stone niay be re-
moved from the land· by the. owner thereof, but 
is an absolute prohibition of any such removal. 
However valuable the rock or stone may be if 
removed, and however valueless if not removed, 
the owner must allow it to remain in its place of 
deposit. Such. a prohibition might be justified, 
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if the removal could not be effected without im-
properly invading the rights of others; but it 
cannot be doubted that rock and stone may, under 
some circumstances, be so severed from the land 
and removed as not in the slightest degree to 
inflict any injury which the law will recognize. 
So far as such use of one's property may be had 
without injury to others, it is a lawful use, which 
cannot be absolutely prohibited by the legislative 
department under the guise of the exercise of the 
police power." (Ex Parte Kelso, 14 7 Cal. 609 ; 
82 Pac. 241, 242). 
"• • • And the reasonableness of the zoning 
as applied to certain lines of commercial zoning 
must be distinguished from the reasonableness 
of zoning regulations prohibiting the development 
of natural resources. The exclusion of ordinary 
business enterprises does not destroy any inherent 
property right, and, if not discriminatory, will be 
held reasonable and valid. Most such businesses 
can be conducted at any other designated place. 
But rock and gravel, like any other natural re-
source, can be obtained only in those particular 
areas where the deposit has been lodged by nature. 
Therefore, it follows that to absolutely prohibit 
the removal of rock, sand, and gravel from one's 
own land in an instance where such land is pri-
marily valuable only by reason of the existence 
of rock, sand and gravel, might be regarded as an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power. Trans-
Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 
Cal. App. 2d, 776, 789, 194 P. 2d 148. • • • As 
affecting the challenged reasonableness of the 
action of the City Council in granting respondent 
Gregg a Conditional Use Permit, there was testi-
mony that his property is located in an area which 
has long been a rock and gravel producing sec-
tion. That within a radius of a mile and a quarter 
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from the subject property are located fifteen 
gravel pits, some active and others idle. That 
there is a public need for the rock and sand 
located on this particular property, and that it 
would be compatible with the greatest public 
service and the least private injury to expand the 
M-3 or unrestricted use zone to include all of the 
land in an area in which the Gregg property is 
located * * *. 
"WhereJ as here, the operations in question 
could not be- characterized as a nuisance per se, 
the court was justified in following a well estab-
lished rule of law which provides that under such 
circumstances the decree should not enjoin more 
than the specific thing which might constitute a 
nuisance, as appears from the requirements of the 
particularcase. ·Pomeroy's Equity Juris., 2d Ed., 
sec$. 1945, 1948. It is now established law in this 
state that the business of excavating rock and 
grayel by the owner from land belonging to him 
is a lawful and useful occupation, and the regu-
lation thereof should go no further than to con-
trol those particular features of the operations 
which might result in substantial injury to ad-
joining property or to persons residing or owning 
property in the near vicinity of the land upon 
which the operations are being conducted. People 
v~ Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 412, 279 P. 136; In re 
Smith,. 143 Cal. 368, 371, 77 P. 180; In re Kelso, 
147 Cal. 609, 613, 82 P. 241, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 796, 
109 Am. St. Rep. 178 ; Byers v. Colonial Irrigation 
Co., 134 Cal. 553, 555, 66 P. 732 ; Vowinckel v. 
N. Clark & Sons,_ 216 Cal. 156, 162, 13 P. 2d 733 
41: "" "" 
·"The court was therefore justified in giving 
heed to the aforesaid rule, that in proper cases 
it will not enjoin the conduct ·of a defendant's 
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entire business where such business is not a nui-
sance per se if less measure of restriction will 
afford plaintiffs the relief to which' they may be 
entitled * * •. (Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 
2d 348, 203 Pac. 2d 37, 48, 49, 50, 51). 
"• • • As a general proposition it may be 
said that dust which substantially interferes with 
the comfortable enjoyment of adjacent premises 
constitutes a nuisance, provided it is sufficient to 
cause perceptible injury to persons or property. 
On the other hand, a reasonable amount of dust 
in a manufacturing community or industrial dis-
trict does not necessarily constitute a nuisance 
even though it may cause some annoyance, and 
this is particularly true where the dust caused 
by the operation of a business is only occasional 
and the resultant injury slight. In other words, 
a given amount of dust in one locality well might 
be considered and held to be a nuisance, and not 
so in others, all depending upon the particular 
facts and circumstances. 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, 
Sec. 57, pp. 339, 340; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, Sec. 
23, p. 777. See annotations in 3 A.L.R. 312; 11 
A.L.R. 1401; and 8 A.L.R. 2d 419 • • *." (Hof-
stetter et al. v. George M. Myers, Inc., 170 Kansas 
564 ; 228 Pac. 2d, 522, 526). 
"* • • The right to recover damages for in-
juries occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, 
foul air, etc., being cast upon one's property by 
another, in proper cases, is well established. But 
the rule of liability is not absolute and the law 
does not afford redress for every such discomfort 
or annoyance. Extreme rights in this regard can-
not be enforced. Of necessity some degree of 
inconvenience and annoyance must be endured or 
community and social life would be impossible. 
It thus follows that what constitutes in law an 
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actionable nuisance is always a question of degree. 
The cases cited and relied on by the plaintiff 
are instances where, under all the circumstances, 
the use of the property complained of was held 
unreasonable. Here, where the facts and circum-
stances, both with respect to the origin and nature 
of the thing complained of and the degree of its 
offense, differ essentially from those of the cases 
cited, we have an entirely different legal question. 
''While a nuisance, in the ordinary sense in 
which the word is used, is anything that produces 
an annoyance-anything that disturbs one or is 
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to 
that class of wrongs that arise from the unreason-
able, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person 
of his property. Every person has the right to 
the reasonable enjoyment of his property. As to 
what is a reasonable use of one's property must 
necessarily depend upon the circumstances of 
each case, for a use for a particular purpose and 
in a particular way, in one locality, that would 
be lawful and reasonable might be unlawful and 
a nuisance in another. 1 Wood on Nuisances (3d 
Ed.) Sees. 1, 2. The test of whether the use of 
the property constitutes a nuisance is the reason-
ableness of the use complained of in the particular 
locality. and in the manner and under the cir-
cumstances of the case. · 29 Cyc. 1156. A business 
which might be perfectly proper in a business or 
manufacturing neighborhood may be a nuisance 
when carried on in a residential district; and, 
conversely, a business which with its incidents 
might be considered a nuisanc~ in a residential 
district may be proof against complaint where 
conducted in a business or manufacturing locality, 
although an extraordinary use of property intro-
ducing a serious annoyance which directly and 
substantially damages the property of another 
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or causes unnecessary annoyance to persons in 
the vicinity is not justified by the fact that the 
place is a manufacturing locality. 29 Cyc. 1157, 
1158 • • •." (Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 
Utah 1, 262 Pac. 269, 272, 273). 
"• • • Where the injury complained of results 
from a business which is not per se a nuisance, 
it being caused only by reason of the manner in 
which the business is conducted or by the sur-
rounding circumstances, it is always proper for 
the court so to frame its decree that defendant's 
business will not be absolutely prohibited, if this 
can be done and still give to plaintiff the relief 
to which he is entitled. Collins v. Wayne Iron 
Work, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 24; 20 R.C.L. p. 482 
• • •." (Mclntosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770, 
230 Pac. 203, 207). 
"• • • In accordance with general rules else-
where stated, a decree enjoining a nuisance should 
specifically point out the things which the defend-
ant is required to do and to refrain from doing 
in order to abate the nuisance which is found to 
exist. It should be as definite, clear, and precise 
in its terms as possible, so that there may be no 
reason or excuse for misunderstanding or disobey-
ing it, and, when practicable, it should plainly 
indicate to the defendant all the acts which he. is 
restrained from doing, without calling upon hin1 
for inferences or conclusions about which per-
sons may well differ • • •. 
"• • • In those instances in which injunction 
lies to prevent conduct amounting to a nuisance 
abatable by such remedy, it is limited to unlawful 
acts, and is not available as a means of prevention 
of lawful acts. Only so much of such conduct as 
is unlawful can be restrained. The decree should 
not enjoin more than that which constitutes the 
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nuisance, and should never go beyond the require-
ments of the particular case. Where the injury 
complained of results from acts that are not a 
nuisance per se, but only such by reason of the 
manner in which they are done or the surrounding 
circumstances, the court will not grant an in-
junction in such form as absolutely to prohibit 
the defendant's use of his property, if it is pos-
sible to frame a decree which in another form 
will give the plaintiff the relief .to which he is 
entitled. 
"The operation of a legitimate business or 
industrial plant which constitutes a private nui-
sance may be enjoined, where it clearly appears 
that there is no other complete remedy for the 
injury -done. But this should never be done if it 
is possible to avoid it while still giving the plain-
tiff the relief to which he is entitled. In such 
cases, the courts will go no further than is abso-
lutely necessary to protect the rights of the com-
plaining parties, and, if the business or plant 
can be so conducted as not to constitute a nui-
sance, the injunction should be limited to prohibit-
ing the acts complained of which constitute the 
nuisance, leaving the defendant free to operate 
it in a proper manner. It has been held that a 
distinction may properly be drawn between cases 
involving a nuisance caused by a factory or busi-
ness which may be removed to another location, 
and those involving one caused by the operation 
of mines, quarries, and other enterprises for the 
development of the natural resources of land, 
which must be conducted at a fixed place, and that 
an injunction should not be granted as readily 
in the latter as in the former class of cases. But 
this distinction is sound only in so far as it relates 
to things- which are reasonably essential to the 
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proper operation of the mine or quarry • • •." 
(39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, Sees. 171, 172, pages 443-
444, 445). 
"• • • We are committed to the rule in this 
jurisdiction that where a lawful business is con-
ducted in such manner as to constitute a private 
nuisance, such nuisance may be enjoined and 
abated, but the injunction ordinarily should be 
limited not to the business itself, but to the usage 
that creates the nuisance, leaving the right to 
carry on the business in a proper and lawful man-
ner and that it is only where such business can-
not be conducted in any manner at the place 
where situated without constituting a substantial 
injury to adjoining property owners that the 
injunction shall absolutely prohibit the operation 
of such business * * * ." (Fidelity Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 190 Okla. 488, 125 Pac. 
2d, 757-759). 
"• • • While a race track is not a nuisance, 
per se, the record is convincing that the track 
and barns have been operated in such a manner 
as to subject plaintiffs to a common or private 
nuisance which should be abated. The rule applic-
able to the present situation was well stated in 
Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 
261, 222 NW 86, 87, as follows : 'While the court 
of equity has power to abate nuisance in pro-
tection of property rights, and to conserve the 
enjoyment, health, comfort, and welfare of indi-
viduals, it moves with caution, deciding each 
case upon its particular facts, and accords pro-
tection against injury only in cases where an 
action at law would afford no adequate redress. 
If a nuisance is private and arises out of a par-
ticular manner. of operating a legitimate business, 
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the court will do no more than point to the nui-
sance and decree adoption of methods calculated 
to eliminate the injurious features * * *.' 
"The trial court's decree, which permanently 
enjoined defendants from further operation of the 
race track, would destroy the business of defend-
ant racing association, which business the legis-
lature has seen fit to legitimatize by the adoption 
of Act No. 199. Our de novo review of the record 
convinces us that this decree did not equitably 
determine the rights of the parties. The common 
or private nuisance complained of by plaintiffs 
arose, at least in part, from the apparently rather 
negligent manner in which the racing association 
operated its track and horse barns. We believe 
that it could adopt methods which would largely 
eliminate the nuisance complained of * *' *. 
"* * * We conclude that the decree of the 
trial court should be vacated and set aside and 
that a decree should be entered in this court in 
accordance with this opinion. The decree should 
among other things, determine * * * ( 5) that the 
method of operation of the race track and the 
horse barns created a private nuisance which, 
insofar as is reasonably possible, should be abated. 
The decree should further provide that defendant 
racing association shall enclose all manure re-
ceptacles; disinfect these receptacles and remove 
all manure from the premises every 24 hours; 
that it shall police and supervise the race track 
premises and horse barns so as to eliminate, inso-
far as possible, all fire hazards, obnoxious noises, 
disturbances, and improper conduct; and that it 
shall from time to time do such other acts and 
things as it can reasonably be required to do to 
abate the private nuisance complained of. The 
decree should further provide for remanding this 
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case to the trial court for enforcement and for 
such further action as may from time to time be 
deemed necessary and advisable • • •." (Rohan 
v. Detroit Racing Association, 314 Mich. ~6, 22 
NW 2d, 433; 166 A.L.R. 1246, 1262, 1263). 
"• • • And in any event, the restraint im-
posed by the decree should be no more extensive 
t.han is reasonably required to protect the inter-
ests of the party in whose favor it was giyen 
• • •." (32 C.J., Injunctions, Sec. 645, Page 378). 
1. The prohibitory provisions of the judgment 
do not specify with particularity the parts of the 
operations of defendant and appellant which are 
prohibited and restrained and as a consequence, 
defendant and appellant cannot determine except 
by trial and error method the specific methods of 
operations which must be corrected in order to com-
ply with the court's order. 
It is clear that the court in its judgment was cogni-
zant of the fact that it was beyond his power and au-
thority to prohibit defendant and appellant from operat-
ing its plant. St-ated otherwise, the court did not intend 
to shut down completely the operations of the plant. A 
fair reading of the prohibitory features of the judgment 
compels the conclusion that the court intended only to 
prohibit and restrain those features of the operations 
which created the nuisance. The problem therefore con-
fronting the defendant and appellant since the entry of 
this judgment has been to determine what aspect of the 
operations must be changed and corrected in order for it 
to eliminate the cause or causes of the nuisance. It is 
submitted that under the authorities above cited it was 
entitled to receive from the court a specific mandate as to 
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what it must or must not do to eliminate the nuisance. 
The question, therefore, is whether or not the injunctive 
phases of the judgment are so broad and general in their 
scope that defendant and appellant must either cease its 
operations entirely or continue its operations at the peril 
of being charged with contempt. In view of the fact 
that court has exercised its injunctive power of regulat-
ing defendant's and appellant's operation, it is the con-
tention of defendant that it was the duty of the court 
to specify with particularity the nuisance causing agen-
cies and direct either that the defendant and appellant 
cease the operations of these agencies or in lieu thereof 
correct the same so as to eliminate the cause of nuisance. 
In considering this a~pect of the judgment defendant 
and appellant directs the court's attention to the follow-
ing precedents which are exceedingly pertinent. The case 
of Williams v. Bluebird Laundry Company, 85 Cal. App. 
388, 259 Pac. 484, involves a nuisance created by the op-
eration of a steam laundry in the City of Los Angeles. 
It was contended. 
"* * * that because the judgment merely re-
strains the defendant from so conducting its plants 
as to cause loud noises, offensive odors, black 
smoke and soot, it is so indefinite as to render it 
ineffective and that it must be reversed; that it is 
impossible to determine what degree of noise or 
degree of odors, etc. would constitute a violation 
of the injunction; and that the defendant may 
be subjected to citations for contempt at any time 
that one of the plaintiffs may deem any noise, 
odors, or smoke objectionable to hi1nself. * * *" 
(259 Pac. 486). 
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The court answered this contention: 
"*' • • However, the judgmep.t plainly states 
that the laundry or laundries shall be so operated 
as to avoid causing loud noises, offensive odors, 
black smoke, or soot or in any other such manner 
as to be deleterious to the health of the plaintiff. 
vVe think the entire judgment when read together 
is sufficiently definite in this regard. • • • If the 
operation of defendant's plant shall be deemed by 
the plaintiffs to create such noises or pollution of 
the atmosphere as to be deleterious to their health 
or offensive to their senses, and should they pro-
duce competent and satisfactory evidence that any 
or all of these objectionable features were injur-
ing or destroying their health, we think they would 
be entitled to relief under the terms of the judg-
ment, otherwise, not. * * *" (259 Pac. 486-487). 
Cited in the Bluebird case is Judson v. Los Angeles 
Suburban Gas Company, 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581. The 
judgment in that case enjoined the defendant from oper-
ating gas works in such a manner as to cause or permit 
smoke, gas or offensive smells or fumes to be emitted 
therefrom or to be precipitated upon the property of 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court said: 
"The appellants are enjoined from maintain-
ing the same sort of nuisance that has caused the 
annoyance to the plaintiff." 
The third case which should be considered is Vow-
inckel v. N. Clark and Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 Pac. (2d) 
733). In this case the court enjoined the defendant. 
"*' * • from operating the four southerly kilns 
and furnaces on the westerly side of its property 
and from operating the remaining kilns and fur· 
naces on the westerly side of its property and 
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northerly of said four southerly furnaces, unless 
and until it shall erect between the northerly 
furnaces and the property of the plaintiffs a sub-
stantial fire proof wall or fence at least fifteen 
feet in height." (13 Pac. (2d) 735). 
The Supreme Court in passing upon this feature of the 
injunction wrote as follows : 
"* * * In the present case the court appears to 
have given due consideration to the situation of the 
defendant. This is apparent from the fact that 
it refused to abate entirely the defendant's opera-
tions and granted the relief sought to the extent 
necessary to preserve the rights of both parties. 
In other words the court in the exercise of its 
equity powers, has compared consequences and 
has considered the injuries resulting to each party, 
on the, one hand if the injunction be wholly denied, 
and on the other if it be granted. The court, from 
the evidence presented, gave heed to the rule that 
in a proper case it will not enjoin the conduct of 
the defendant's entire business, where such busi-
ness is not a nuisance per se, if a less measure of 
restriction will afford to the plaintiff the relief 
to which he may be entitled. * * * 
"The defendant contends that all of the in-
fringements upon the plainttiff's rights can be eli-
minated by the erection of a fireproof sound-
absorbing wall enclosing also the four kilns 
ordered abated. An offer to construct such a wall, 
with sliding doors. to permit loading, was made 
upon the defendant's motion for a new trial; and 
testimony of engineers and samples of materials 
proposed to be used were produced on the hearing 
of the motion. The trial court, however, declined 
the offer and denied the motion for a new trial. 
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./ 
This ruling is claimed to be prejudicial error and 
we are urged to reverse or modify the judgment 
on the ground that the proposed wall will give to 
the plaintiff all the relief to which he is entitled. 
But we are not persuaded that the court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion. The court it-
self viewed the premises, and although it may 
have been shown that the wall might tend to re-
duce the fire hazard and flares, nevertheless the 
denial of the motion is persuasive that the court 
remained unconvinced that either the vibrations or 
noise would be disminished or eliminated. The 
character of the property abated, and its location 
with respect to the plaintiff's dwelling, together 
with the finding that its operation causes great 
vibration and noise disturbing to the plaintiff 
and his household, is conclusive against the show-
ing attempted to be made by the defendant. The 
record shows that the trial court was justified in 
abating a portion of the defendant's factory on the 
ground that to control only the mannerof its con-
duct would be inadequate relief to the plaintiff 
from the nuisance thereby maintained * * *." 13 
Pac. ( 2d) 736-737). 
The first two cited cases appear upon first reading 
to. support the form of the injunction in the instant case. 
However, a careful study of the factors involved in these 
cases indicates that the situation confronting the defend-
ant and appellant with respect ·to the present judgment 
is entirely different from the situations involved in the 
said two cases. 
According to the court's findings in this case the con-
stituent elements of the nuisance are (a) dust which is 
precipiated upon the plaintiffs' properties; (b) noise 
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created by the operations of the plant and repair of roll-
ers, and (c) light flashes created by welding operations. 
The evidence was sharply conflicting on each of these 
issues, but resultant therefrom is proof of the methods 
of operation of defendant's and appellant's plant which 
require the use of many different kinds of machinery and 
equipment (R. 70-880, Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19); of the 
operations involved in the excavating of the raw mate-
rials and its transportation from the point of excavation 
to the crushe:rs (R. 828, 850); of the actual processing 
operations of crushing and grinding (R. 871, 877-879); of 
the transportation of the completed material to the stock 
piles (Ex. 6, 22) ; of the loading of the finished product 
from the stock piles into trucks for transportation to 
market (R. 905,. 906); and of the methods and means of 
maintenance and repair of the plant (R. 882-894). The 
processing operations therefore are complicated and 
varied, but not all of the operations create a nuisance. 
The evidence before the court was exhaustive and covered 
the entire field of operations. The court had before it a 
great number of photographs pres.entedby both plaintiffs 
and defendant which reveal the complexity of the opera-
tion and the great variance among the different phases of 
processing the raw materials to the end that the finished 
product is available. The operations of the steam laundry 
involved in the Bluebird case, supra, and the gas plant in 
the Judson case, supra, are simple, and the bro.ad, g(merru 
prohibitions in the injunctions· in these cases, would pro-
tect the respective plaintiffs and inform the defendants as 
to causes and allow them to take direct corrective mea.s-
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ures. Not so in the pre sen~ case because of the vari-
ables involved in the processing operations. It was the 
duty of the court in its findings and judgment to select 
the specific causes and direct that the previous operations 
giving ri~e to these causes should either cease or be cor-
rected. Without specific and particular mandates di-
rected at specific and particular causes, the judgment 
becomes one of general prohibition against the operation 
of defendant's plant and thereby nullifies the intention 
of the court to reach only the nuisance causing agencies. 
The prohibitory features of the judgment are so broad 
effectually to shut down the operations of the plant unless 
defendant and appellant takes upon itself the peril of 
determining which of the causes contribute to the viola-
tion of the injunction. The law does not cast this burden 
upon the defendant and appellant. The authorities cited 
above clearly instruct .the court to specify the particular 
operations which are enjoined to the end that the defend-
ant's attention is directed to san1e so that it may eliminate 
the causes of complaint. 
Rule 65A (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, speci-
fically prescribes that: 
"Every order granting an injunction and 
every restraining order shall be specific in terms ; 
shall describe in reasonable detail and not by 
reference to the complaint or other document, 
the act or acts sought to be restrained * * ""." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The judgment in this case violates this rule and creates 
the confusion and uncertainty above delineated. Para-
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graph one of the judgment enjoins the defendant from 
maintaining, using, or operating its gravel pit and proces-
sing plant 
"so as to create a nuisance affecting plaintiffs, 
their lands, homes, premises, and use thereof, aris-
ing from objectionable noise, dust, and flashing 
lights as found by the Court and in the same man-
ner and as more particularly set out and described 
in the findings of fact on file herein." (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Here is a direct violation of the rule above cited. The 
judgment in contravention of the rule refers to the find-
ings of fact which is the "other document" denounced 
by the rule. The rule is intended to prevent exactly what 
has occurred in this case. As Barron and Holtzoff state 
"It is insufficient to enjoin a defendant from 
violations 'as charged in the complaint.' It is also 
insufficient merely to incorporate long and ver-
bose findings ; since the order should furnish the 
defendant with a direct and succinct statement of 
his alleged wrongful acts." 
Reference is made to the form of the judgment in the 
Vowinckel case, supra wherein the court specifically 
enjoined the defendant 
"from operating the four southern kilns and 
furnaces on the westerly side of its property and 
from operating the remaining kilns. and furnaces 
on the westerly side of its property and northerly 
of said four southerly furnaces unless and until 
it shall erect between said northerly furnaces and 
the property of the plaintiff a substantial fire-
proof wall or fence at least fifteen feet in height." 
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Here is an example of a court giving due considera-
tion to the specific cause of nuisance and interdicting 
the same or causing corrective measures to be taken 
by the defendant. The modus operandi of the injunction 
in the Vowinckel case is applicable to the instant case and 
shows what the court should have done in controlling the 
nuisance causing factors in the gravel plant operations. 
It is respectfully submitted that the present judgment is 
erroneous in that it fails to follow the mandate of rule 
65A (b). 
2. It was the duty of the court to establish a 
maximum tolerance for the contamination and pollu-
tion of the air by dust part=.cles and the absence of 
such provision in the judgment exposes the defend-
ant and appellant to charges of violating the injunc-
tion regardless of its good faith and honest purpose. 
Defendant and appellant is entitled to receive from 
the court a specific mandate that the atmosphere 
shall .not contain at anytime more than a maximum 
quantity of dust and fore~gn particles. 
It was proved at the trial that the area in which de-
fendant and appellant conducts its operations contains 
a valuable deposit of sand and gravel (R. 830, 831, 952) 
and that the material is considered the best and most 
effective produced in the western section of the United 
States (R. 950). tt was shown that the sand, 
gravel and road aggregate yielded not only by the Walker 
Deposit, but by the surrounding area, enters· into the 
economy of Salt Lake City and is a highly necessary 
material in the construction industry (R. 952). Further 
the evidence shows that there are nine other gravel and 
sand producing operations within a radius of six thou-
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sand feet from the Walker Deposit and defendant's 
operations (R. 943-947). The evidence is conclusive that 
these nine other operations cause dust and foreign parti-
cles to impregnate the atmosphere (R. 941-942, 954, Ex. 
25). There is also evidence that in spite of the black top-
ping of Wasatch Boulevard, the Big Cottonwood road 
and the Butlerville Hill road, that passing vehicles cause 
a great amount of dust to arise therefrom (R. 927, 934). 
It is therefore apparent that even though the operations 
of defendant's plant entirely ceased that the atmosphere 
of the area in which plaintiffs' homes are located would 
carry a certain amount of foreign particles arising from 
these nine other gravel and sand operations and the pub-
lic highways. It certainly will not be contended that de-
fendant is responsible in any degree for the dust contri-
buted to the atmosphere by these other operations. At-
tention is invited to the case of Hofstetter v. Geo. M. 
Myer, Inc. supra, wherein it was stated "that the dust 
produced by the plant is the same dust common to the 
community and especially the road passing the plant and 
the homes of plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs have some 
dust, smoke and odors throughout the year from the dirt 
and gravel road, adjacent railroad lines, and from the 
city refuge dump.* • *" (228 P. (2d) 526). 
The evidence in this case shows that there exists in 
the area of the plaintiffs' properties an atmospheric 
condition over which the defendant and appellant has 
no control. This condition is produced by the other 
sand and gravel operations in the vicinity and the public 
highways. The evidence not only permits, but. also com-
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pels the conclusion that even if defendant's and appel-
lant's plant entirely ceased operations, that the atmos-
phere at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon and in 
the vicinity of plaintiffs' properties would be impreg-
nated with dust arising from these other operations and 
use of the public highways. This is not a situation where 
defendant operates its plant in a district which is free 
from atmospheric contamination caused by industrial 
activities, but conversely, is a situation where defend-
ant's operations are conducted in an area which already 
possesses contaminated atmosphere arising from indus-
, 
trial causes. 
Under the authorities cited, supra, it was the duty 
of the trial court in framing its judgment to have taken 
into consideration the fact that the atmosphere surround-
ing and over plaintiffs' properties_ was not a dust free 
atmosphere, but independent . of defendant's operations, 
it normally carries a substantial burden of foreign par-
ticles. A finding that .defendant was_ guilty of creating 
and maintaining a dust nuisance must of necessity be 
premised on the hypothesis that defendants' operations 
increased the normal dust laden content of. the atmos-
phere to a point· which _would be characterized a legal 
nuisance. The defendant is not chargeable with the re-
sponsibility for the normal atmospheric conditions; and 
therefore, the court should have determined: 
(1) The normal dust fall in the vicinity independent 
of defendant's operations; and 
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(2) The amount of foreign particles which could 
be added to the atmosphere by defendant's operation 
without inflicting injury upon the plaintiffs and their 
properties. 
There was adequate evidence before the court to 
have permitted and authorized it to make such findings. 
Reference is made to the testimony of the expert, F. E. 
Netzeband (R. :1!336, 1337, 1340, 1343-1347, 1354, 1359); 
and to the testimony of the expert, Daniel J. Jones (R. 
1461, 1474) for evidence upon which such findings and 
provision of the judgment might have been founded. 
In this connection, the court would have been authorized 
to require the installation of certain methods of deter-
mining on a day to day basis the dust fall in the plant 
area. 
Defendant and appellant respectfully submits that 
it is entitled to this guide rule in its operations to the 
end that it will not be constantly exposed to litigation 
and charges of violating the court's decree. The evidence 
shows that there is a degree of tolerance between the 
normal atmospheric contamination of plaintiffs' neigh-
borhood and the maximum amount of atmospheric con-
tamination which becomes a nuisance. The defendant 
is entitled to the benefit of this tolerance in its operations 
and the court in its judgment should have established 
this maximum tolerance for the contamination of the air 
by dust particles. It was entitled to receive from the 
court a specific mandate designating the maximum quan-
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tity of dust and foreign particles in the atmosphere 
which would be permitted before a charge of violating 
the judgment could be successfully laid against it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court in this equity case has the 
power and authority, 
"• • • to go behind the findings and decree of 
the trial court, consider all the evidence, decide 
on which side the preponderance thereof is, ascer-
tain whether or not the proof justifies the findings 
and decree, and enter or direct such findings and 
decree to be entered as the evidence, in the judg-
ment of the appellate tribunal, may justify." 
(Whittaker vs. Ferguson~ 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980; 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 913; Baird v. 
Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 527, 257 P. 
1060; Dahl vs.·Cayias, 110 Utah 398, 174 P. (2d) 
430). 
Further, the court is authorized to remand this case 
to the trial court with directions to modify the judgment 
and findings so as to conform to the opinion of the appel-
late tribunal. (Salina Creek Irrigation Co. vs. Salina 
Stock Company, 7 Utah 456; 27 P. 578. Affirmed 163 
U. 8.109, 41 L. Ed. 90,16 S. Ct.1036). 
2. In view of the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court, defendant and appellant respectfully urges that 
the judgment in this action should be set aside and the 
case remanded to the trial court with directions: (1) 
that findings of fact 9, Conclusions of Law 2, and Para-
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graph 2 of the Judgment (as the same pertains to the 
Rudd right of way) be stricken in their entirety; (2) 
That the findings and judgment (after the right of way 
elements are eliminated) should be reformed so as (a) 
to specify the par~~~~ar method, instrumentality, or 
agency which causes the dust and noise to arise and to 
confine the prohibitory features of the judgment to these 
particularly defined· methods, instruments and agencies, 
and (b) to determine the normal dust fall in the area 
of pla~ntiffs' properties and to define the maximum toler-
ance of dust fall·which will be permitted without viola-
tion of the provisions of the judgment as reformed. 
. .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ 
FRANKLIN RITER 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
. Appellant. 
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